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Abstract 
  
 In this thesis I argue that the tradition of political philosophy which follows in 
John Rawls's footsteps is obligated to concern itself not only with the realizability, but 
also with the realization, of justice. Although Rawls himself expresses a commitment 
only to the former of these, I argue that the roles which he assigns to political philosophy 
require him to take on the further commitment to realization. This is because these roles 
are meant to influence not only political philosophers, but the citizens of the wider 
community as well. The realistically utopian role, which I take to be the central one, 
requires political philosophy to inspire in that population a hope which I argue that 
realizability alone cannot provide. Given the deep revisions regarding the political nature 
of justice as fairness which Rawls made on the basis of realizability concerns, I argue that 
his theory must in this case be committed to a similar revision. The hope which political 
philosophy is meant to provide is simply not realizable until the discipline concerns itself 
centrally with the task of realization.   
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Introduction: Realizability and Realization in Political Philosophy 
 
I have an intuition that I cannot shake: writing about justice means caring about 
injustice. When I read philosophical work on justice, part of me is pleased to have a 
better grasp of its constitutive parts, and of what an ideally just world might look like or 
entail. But a much, much larger part of me is dismayed that our own world doesn‘t look 
anything like that ideally just world that is being discussed. And the largest part of me by 
far is just frustrated. As philosophers who think about justice, we have a better sense than 
most of what our goal ought to look like. As even moderately aware and educated 
individuals, we can plainly see that what we have now is not what our philosophy is 
describing. And finally, simply as human beings, insofar as we wholeheartedly endorse a 
particular norm, we just do care about whether or not it obtains. When we as political 
philosophers recognize ourselves (as I think we cannot help but do) as those uniquely 
situated at the intersection of these three positions – philosophers who conceptualize 
ideals of justice, educated individuals who recognize our realities, and human beings who 
care in a deep way about the things which we take to have value – I can‘t help feeling 
that we really only have one option. We are in perhaps a better position than the members 
of any other single profession to conceptualize the world as it should be. If we also care 
about how the world should be, how can we not feel drawn to work in whatever 
immediate and practical ways that we can to bring about the world that we want? All of 
that thought, those hours, days, months, and even years thinking about what justice 
requires, and how the world ought to be – writing about justice just must mean caring 
deeply when justice is violated and abused. 
Recently, a friend of a friend let me read his dissertation on the feasibility debate 
in philosophy (Ferriera 2009). In the simplest terms, the debate centers around the 
question of whether or not ―ought‖ implies ―can‖. Political philosophers tend to be of two 
minds when it comes to this question. One group thinks that the obligations placed upon 
us by principles of justice are in no way lessened if meeting them is beyond our power. In 
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their eyes, the demands of justice are unconditional, and "ought" therefore need not imply 
"can". The other group thinks that the only demands of justice which we can be obligated 
to abide by are those which we have the ability to meet. For them, demands of justice 
apply to humans, and it can only be true that we ought to do those things which are 
within our limited human power. In this case, feasibility is a strict limiting condition on 
the sorts of demands that justice can make. 
My treatment of this debate has been, I recognize, remarkably brief. This is 
because it is simply not my concern here. At the back of my mind, as I read Ferriera's 
dissertation, there remained for me the persistent feeling that the most important question 
of all was not being asked as a part of the feasibility debate. The debate certainly 
addresses many of the questions that are raised by an intuition like mine: if writing about 
justice means caring about injustice, then it will also mean caring about what justice can 
and cannot require us to do. Questions about feasibility will indeed help us to see how 
justice and the world fit together. Ferriera's dissertation was my first substantive 
introduction to the feasibility debate, and it introduced me to many of the specific 
elements of Rawls's work which have proved to be so central to my own project. He 
alerted me to the importance of both realistic utopia and hope. Yet he considers them 
only in the context of feasibility. Since feasibility is his concern, this seems appropriate – 
yet I cannot shake the feeling that discussing these concepts in light of feasibility alone is 
not enough. There seems to me to be a further, and more important question, which the 
feasibility debate fails to address: how should the recommendations made in light of our 
conclusions about feasibility be played out in relationship to our world?  
Indeed, I am not sure that the feasibility debate simply leaves this question 
unanswered – I think that its terminology actually discourages the asking. Discussing 
―feasibility‖ makes it seem as if the debate is (or at least could be) self-contained. Once 
we‘ve answered the question of feasibility, there doesn‘t seem to be any obvious further 
question to be asked. For this reason, I prefer to talk about realizability. Realizability, like 
feasibility, can be debated as a possible limiting condition on demands of justice. It lets 
us ask all of the same questions about ―ought‖ and ―can‖, and it lets us fit justice and the 
world together in the same ways. Indeed, I take the content of ―realizability‖ to be no  
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different from that of ―feasibility‖. I choose the former term, however, because of the 
obvious bundle of terms that comes with it. A proposal may be ―unrealizable‖, 
―realizable‖, or ―realized‖. ―Realized‖, however, has no counterpart when we are 
discussing feasibility. Here, a proposal may only be ―infeasible‖ or ―feasible‖. There is 
no third term which is necessarily attached to that proposal's implementation.  I 
choose to discuss realizability rather than feasibility because the former term invites us to 
ask an obvious further question in a way that the latter does not.  
It is this further question which is of such crucial and central importance to both 
my intuition and my project in this thesis: once we have answered the question of 
realizability, the obvious next question is that of realization. By realization, I mean the 
actual bringing about of the conditions of justice in the real world. Realizability, like 
feasibility, asks about what justice can hypothetically require of us as both individuals 
and societies. Realization, on the other hand, asks us to take on the further task of 
engaging with the world in order to make these requirements features of real human 
societies. The feasibility debate, then, is by no means unimportant to my project. 
Entertaining an intuition like mine, however, requires treating that debate as a starting 
point, rather than as a complete conversation in and of itself. In this thesis, I take for 
granted that realizable conceptions of justice are the only ones whose obligations we 
must take seriously: attempting the realization of any other sort of conception would be a 
fool's errand.   
But poorly articulated intuitions and convictions, no matter how strongly held, 
hardly make for good philosophy. In this thesis I have tried instead to get at my intuition 
by addressing a collection of smaller questions which arise from it: What is political 
philosophy meant to do? Is it really just metaphysics of justice, or does it have a role 
beyond determining justice's nature? What should be the relationship between the 
limitations of the world and our ideals for that world? When our philosophy doesn‘t fit 
the world, how should we react? Should we revaluate and reformulate our ideals, or does 
such revaluation and reformulation of ideals compromise them too much? And in the end, 
again: what is political philosophy meant to do? Once these questions have been 
answered, I hope to show that it is the case that, on the basis of the commitments that 
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political philosophy already has, my intuition is an instructive one.  
I've chosen to undertake this project in the context of the work of John Rawls for 
several reasons. First, and most obviously, it was Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, who 
refocused the attention of the philosophical community on questions of social justice. 
Without him, it is hard to say whether there would be space for a thesis of this sort at all. 
Second, much of the current literature on justice, even if no longer a direct reaction to his 
work, still owes Rawls a heavy debt. His theories and concepts laid the groundwork for 
much of what we do today. If I want to consider the purposes of political philosophy, 
then, it makes sense to return to the principles on which the modern discipline was 
originally based. Certainly, in order to do political philosophy, we need not accept all of 
Rawls's principles - but if we do not, we should at least have a reason why. Finally, I 
concentrate on Rawls because I think that he has chosen the right side in the feasibility 
debate: he is committed to articulating principles of justice which could effectively 
govern real human beings. It seems to me that only a theory of justice of this sort will be 
a valuable tool in addressing real questions of injustice. 
Nevertheless, I think that there are significant problems with Rawls's theory of 
justice. Although it falls on what I take to be the right side of the feasibility debate, like 
that debate, it does not engage with the further question of realization. And on its own 
terms, I will argue that this is unacceptable. The central goal of this thesis will be to show 
that, if we commit ourselves to the purposes of political philosophy which Rawls 
proposes, then we as political philosophers must also be committed to doing the work of 
realization.  
In Chapter One, I provide an introduction to parts of Rawls's work which will be 
required to understand the rest of the thesis. Here, I have several aims: first, I outline 
certain key concepts in Rawls's work, including ideal and nonideal theory and the various 
roles which each of these can have; political liberalism and its ties to stability and 
realizability; and the conditions of a well-ordered society. Second, I argue for my claim 
concerning Rawls's position in the feasibility debate. Third, I show that, although Rawls 
is committed enough to realizability to undertake major revisions to his theory, he does 
nothing either to engage with realization or to recommend that other political 
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philosophers should.   
In Chapter Two, I turn explicitly to the roles that Rawls proposes for political 
philosophy, in order to show, contra Rawls, that they should commit us to realization 
rather than simple realizability. I argue that Rawls fails to take seriously the necessary 
connection which all of these roles have to the world outside of the philosophical 
community, and show how all of the previous roles should ultimately be taken to be in 
the service of the final one which Rawls proposes: that of realistically utopian 
philosophy. I end the chapter with the claim that these roles of political philosophy 
require us to ask two further questions of Rawls's theory. These are roughly, 1) Can the 
conditions for a well-ordered society obtain? and 2) Do we have reason to hope that these 
conditions will obtain? If these questions cannot be answered in the affirmative, then I 
think that Rawls is committed to rework his theory in the same way that other failures of 
realizability have required him to do.  
In the final chapter, I attempt to provide answers to these two questions, and to 
show that Rawls's philosophy does not give us the tools which we require to meet the 
purposes that he himself sets out. The greatest of these is hope, and here I show that, on 
the basis of what hope is, it cannot be achieved in a practically useful, epistemically 
responsible way unless we require political philosophy to concern itself centrally with 
realization. This means that not only Rawls, but also we as political philosophers who 
follow in his footsteps, are obligated either to engage in the work of realization, or to 
reject and replace the purposes of political philosophy which he sets out. But I think that 
we cannot do the latter, for his purposes, and the hope which they inspire, are intimately 
related to the sorts of creatures that we human beings are. 
This thesis, however, may seem somewhat hypocritical. Although I argue that 
political philosophy must engage itself in the concrete work of realization, I do not 
myself do this. I admit that I do not - but that sort of project is one for an entire discipline, 
not a single thesis. Nevertheless, in my conclusion, I gesture to some of the ways in 
which political philosophy can do that work. This work, I suggest, will have two parts. 
First, political philosophers will need to write a new sort of political philosophy: they will 
need to write what I call nonideal theory as transition. This sort of philosophy will engage 
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with questions of what we may acceptably do in our nonideal world that will bring us 
closer to the ideal world of a well-ordered society. Second, political philosophers must 
engage with members of other disciplines and industries to put these recommendations 
into practice. I will make particular suggestions for our educational and legal systems, but 
recognize that these are but two of the many ways in which political philosophy can join 
with other disciplines to do the work of realization.  
This will mean maintaining a focus on the traditional subject matter of political 
philosophy: we will certainly need to continue to think about appropriate political ideals 
and goals. But it will also mean creating a new focus on a different sort of subject matter: 
the real world and the ways in which it can actually be changed will need to become our 
new focus. I think that it is appropriate to end this introduction with a quote from Barack 
Obama. He is not a philosopher, but as a politician he is the sort of individual with whom 
political philosophers will need to engage if they are to take realization seriously. He is 
speaking here of the specific problem of race relations in America, but his broader point, 
I think, should be extended to all of our work on justice: 
To think clearly about race, then, requires us to see the world on a split screen 
– to maintain in our sights the kind of America that we want while looking 
squarely at America as it is, to acknowledge the sins of our past and the 
challenges of the present without becoming trapped in cynicism or despair. 
This doesn‘t need to be political in the wrong way – not just compromise. It‘s 
looking at what we want and what we have, to figure out how to get from one 
to the other (Obama 2006: 233). 
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Chapter 1: Rawls’s Work and its Commitment to Realizability 
 
So much of philosophy follows in Plato‘s footsteps. Political philosophy, I think, 
is no exception. His Republic paints a picture in which the character of the ideally just 
city is a matter of abstract truth which stands in no meaningful relationship to the 
empirical facts of our world. The nature of that ideal city remains the same, whether or 
not real human beings in the real world could ever meet its demands and serve as its 
proper citizens, for the demands of that ideal are no less pressing if they are impossible to 
meet. As Plato says of that city, ―its pattern is already there in heaven‖ and ―the question 
of its present or future existence makes no difference‖ (Plato 1966: 592b). It seems to 
follow from this that the way that the world ought to be has little to do with the way that 
it actually is. The role that political philosophy should play for Plato, then, is that of 
discovering the truth of the ideal city‘s nature, rather than investigating the relationship 
between that nature and the state of our own world.  
 It is interesting to note that in the work of John Rawls, who has been quite 
possibly the most influential political philosopher of the last century, this concern with 
the ultimate true nature of justice is largely left behind. Instead, on the basis of his 
commitment to real justice in real human democracies, he turns his attention from the 
question of justice's truth to the question of its reasonableness.
1
 This is belied by the way 
in which he phrases what he takes to be the fundamental question of political philosophy: 
―What is the most acceptable political conception of justice for specifying the fair terms 
of cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, and as both reasonable and 
rational, and as normal and fully cooperating members of a society over a complete life, 
from one generation to the next?‖ (JF 7-8). By asking about the ―most acceptable‖ 
conception of justice, he makes it at once clear that he is not concerned with an 
                                                 
1
 This is because claims of moral truth can only be made from within particular comprehensive doctrines. 
For this reason, Rawls rejects moral principles which are true for more narrow moral political principles 
which can be endorsed by those who subscribe to all reasonable comprehensive doctrines. For more on 
comprehensive doctrines and truth, see Political Liberalism pp. xx and the latter sections of this chapter. 
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exposition of justice which is true at the metaphysical level, and that there are a number 
of conceptions which are at least prima facie plausible candidates for the solution to the 
question. It should be clear, simply from his phrasing of the question, that Rawls is not 
undertaking the Platonic project of describing the truth of justice as it is laid up in 
heaven.  
By the end of his life, Rawls had become concerned with articulating principles of 
justice which could be the focus of an overlapping consensus in a politically liberal 
constitutional democracy. Since the individual members of this sort of plural society will 
always hold a variety of different beliefs about the good – a situation to which Rawls 
refers as ―the fact of reasonable pluralism‖2 – any principle by which all can agree to be 
governed must necessarily abstain from making claims about matters of ultimate and 
metaphysical truth. A principle of justice cannot be discovered and then imposed upon 
such a society, for the content of any such principle would necessarily violate the 
reasonable commitments and beliefs of many of that society‘s members. Rather, to 
answer political philosophy‘s fundamental question in this sort of society, Rawls‘s 
concern must be with what works; he must worry about whether and how a conception of 
justice can govern real human beings who disagree about many aspects of their world.      
Yet if Rawls‘s project is not an attempt to discover the abstract truth about the 
facts of justice, neither is it purely pragmatic in the Rortian sense – it is not an attempt to 
replace a concern with truth with a concern with the distinction between ―descriptions of 
the world and of ourselves which are less useful and those which are more useful‖ (Rorty 
1999: 27). Rorty's pragmatism takes as its starting point the world which we have, filled 
as it is with confusion, mistakes, and potential. His attempts to create a more just world 
begin with the problems with which we actually find ourselves confronted, and similarly 
try to form solutions from the building blocks of the world around us. While Rorty‘s 
project is concerned with understanding and working within the actual world in which we 
live, many of the aspects of our own actual world are irrelevant to Rawls. Although 
                                                 
2
 Of course, some conceptions of the good will also be unreasonable. These conceptions are ones which are 
willing to use political power to suppress other reasonable but conflicting conceptions of the good. Rawls‘s 
concern will be with containing rather than accommodating these unreasonable conceptions. For more on 
reasonable and unreasonable conceptions of the good, see Political Liberalism, Lecture II, Section 3.   
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Rawls is indeed concerned less with truth than with what can in fact govern human 
beings, his work nevertheless concentrates on governing human beings in a world that is 
quite unlike our own. Fully understanding this will require spelling out in some detail a 
number of Rawls‘s basic concepts, and the remainder of this chapter will be spent on this 
project. The broad point for now is that the relationship between the ideal and the actual 
in Rawls is a complex one. He is concerned neither with explicating a conception of 
justice which is ideal in the sense of Plato‘s ideal city, nor with confronting our actual 
world's problems of injustice as Rorty might be. Rawls's program is importantly different 
from both of these, and at this point it remains ambiguous to what extent the ideal and the 
actual can indeed be separated in his work. 
 
Ideal and nonideal theory 
 When I said that Rawls concentrates on a world quite unlike our own, I meant that 
his principles of justice are conceived in light of and chosen to govern a society which 
lacks many of our own world‘s propensities to injustice. Rawls finds it useful to break his 
theory of justice into two parts: ideal and nonideal theory. In A Theory of Justice, he 
expresses the distinction in the following way: 
The intuitive idea is to split the theory of justice into two parts. The first or ideal 
part assumes strict compliance and works out the principles that characterize a 
well-ordered society under favorable circumstances. It develops the conception of 
a perfectly just basic structure and the corresponding duties and obligations of 
persons under the fixed constraints of human life. My main concern is with this 
part of the theory. Nonideal theory, the second part, is worked out after the ideal 
conception of justice has been chosen; only then do the parties ask which 
principles to adopt under less happy circumstances (TJ 216). 
 
Very roughly, ideal theory is concerned with working out the principles of justice which 
would best govern a real society under the circumstances most hospitable to justice‘s 
correct functioning. It envisions a society in which citizens have both the will and the 
ability to support and abide by those principles. Nonideal theory fills the gaps left by 
ideal theory: it concerns itself with questions of partial compliance and of the transition 
from our own world to the world to which ideal theory would apply. As Rawls notes in 
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the quotation above, only ideal theory is central to his project of conceptualizing his 
theory of justice. Although he does offer very brief discussions of partial compliance 
theory in a number of his works, nonideal theory as transition receives hardly more than a 
mention of its existence. Rawls spends no time giving content to this concept. 
As Rawls says, nonideal theory is written after and in light of ideal theory. For 
this reason, I will also begin my discussion of the two with ideal theory. However, we 
must qualify the rough conception given above of ideal theory's subject matter. Even if 
ideal theory is the appropriate place to begin, it will need to be tempered by nonideal 
theory in at least three ways. In the first case, while strict
3
 compliance with the ideals of 
justice is perhaps a realistic goal, total compliance without exception is utopian in the 
pejorative sense. A society in which every citizen without fail both desires and is able to 
support and abide by those principles is entirely unrealistic. In any real world, there will 
always be isolated individuals who will be insufficiently motivated to act justly, and will 
attempt to take advantage of society in whatever way they can. Plato‘s ideally just city, 
whose existence in heaven does not depend on its existence in our world, could excusably 
demand not only strict, but total, compliance of this sort. Rawls‘s theory of justice, 
however, concerned as it is with governing real human beings, cannot ignore that there 
will be such breaches in compliance with justice. Nonideal theory, then, will be needed to 
address the questions which arise from these breaches, and must be prepared to provide 
insight in matters such as those of the penal system, compensatory justice, and civil 
disobedience (TJ 8).   
Second, any society made up of real human beings must be a historical society, in 
which both unintentional historical contingencies and more intentional, systematic, 
historically unjust institutions may have left behind imperfect situations to which a well-
ordered, ideally just society must answer (TJ 216). Although incidences of this first sort – 
unavoidable physical disability, for instance, or a past in which a series of not unjust 
interactions between individuals has led to a present in which the life chances of 
individual citizens are radically different – might not be matters of justice in themselves, 
responding to them certainly is. And, when we are presented with situations in which 
                                                 
3
 That is, if we take strict to mean broad and deep, rather than exceptionless. 
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disparate life chances have sprung from a history of unjust institutions (as, perhaps, in the 
case of the great differences in wealth and income between post-apartheid South Africa‘s 
black and white populations), attending to these inequalities is even more obviously a 
matter of justice.  Once again, while Plato could ignore these sorts of considerations, 
overcoming them by fiat in his ideal city, Rawls cannot. Although they remain outside of 
the realm of ideal theory, Rawls must nevertheless recognize that they are issues with 
which any real society must grapple. However, since none of these questions, although 
realities in even the well-ordered society to which ideal theory applies, can reasonably be 
thought of as the sorts of questions of strict compliance which would be dealt with by 
ideal theory, they must also be answered by nonideal theory.  
 In the third case, it should be clear that our actual society is not one in which there 
is general consensus, let alone broad will on the part of many or most citizens to behave 
justly. In order for human beings to be effectively governed by the sort of justice that 
Rawls proposes, many things will need to change. Nonideal theory will also be necessary 
in our thoughts about a transition from our own society to the one to which ideal theory 
would apply. It is this second type of nonideal theory that receives the least attention in 
Rawls‘s work, and I will argue that it is in fact precisely this inattention that renders the 
Rawlsian relationship between the ideal and the actual not only complex but also 
problematic. This second type of nonideal theory will be discussed further below.  
  Before we explore what exactly it is that places the bulk of Rawls‘s work so 
squarely in the realm of ideal theory, however, let us note again what ―ideal‖ will not 
connote when we use it to describe that theory. Although it follows on from the contrast 
with Plato‘s ideal city, it is worth noting explicitly that Rawls is not concerned with 
justice in a perfect society. Rawls is concerned with a conception of justice that can 
effectively govern real human beings. Human beings can certainly be far better in a 
plethora of ways than they are now, and Rawls‘s ideal theory is designed with many of 
these improvements in mind. Human beings shall never, however, be perfect. Although 
Rawls concentrates on ideal theory, he recognizes that it will always need to be 
complemented by nonideal theory if it is to lead to a conception of justice which can 
serve to govern real human beings even in their best conceivable state. Some of the 
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realities which separate even this idealized society from a state of Platonic perfection 
may be regrettable (like the necessity of a penal system in any real society), while others 
most certainly will not be (think here of the burdens of judgement,
4
 and the free use of 
reason in a democratic society). Regrettable or not, however, realities they remain. And 
given all of these realities, Rawls‘s aim in ideal as well as nonideal theory is to formalize 
the principles of justice which would effectively govern not a perfect society, but the best 
one for which the realities of our world allow us to hope.  
  
Ideal theory as thought experiment: the original position, the veil of ignorance 
 Having noted what it does not mean for Rawls‘s theory to be ideal, we must now 
explore further what it does mean. His theory of justice is ideal in at least two important 
senses. The first of these, discussed in this section, concerns his use of thought 
experiments and the implicit convictions of democracy which we must assume to obtain 
in a society in order for those thought experiments to yield the appropriate results. The 
second, addressed in the next section, concerns the nature of the society to which justice 
as fairness is meant to apply. I turn now to the first of these. Understanding this facet of 
ideality will require a broader understanding of some of the central features of Rawls‘s 
account. Let us begin with the concept of justice as fairness.  
 It is hardly controversial to say either that different principles of justice have held 
sway in different parts of the world and at different points in history, or that these 
conceptions have been heavily influenced by the predominant conceptions of the good 
and of human nature particular to those places and times. At various historical moments, 
accepted principles of justice have not been taken to apply, or been applied very 
differently, to (for example) slaves, women, children, and non-whites. Even today, 
conceptions of justice vary widely. The conception of justice found in a libertarian state 
will differ greatly from one found in a state arranged primarily around concerns of social 
welfare.   
                                                 
4
 The burdens of judgement are the numerous reasonable sources of disagreement to be found in a society 
in which the right of conscience is honored. For a full list of these burdens, see Justice as Fairness pp. 35-
36. 
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 Rawls himself is working from a liberal democratic position which sees all human 
beings as moral persons, regardless of the morally irrelevant characteristics like race or 
gender which might be attached to them. The moral person is defined by two powers: 
first, she possesses the capacity for a conception of the good, which means that she can 
choose for herself a rational plan of life. Second, she has the capacity for a sense of 
justice, which expresses itself as a ―regulative desire to act upon certain principles of 
right‖ (TJ 491). Since these moral powers are possessed by all members of a society,5 it is 
equally important that each of these legitimate plans of the good be accommodated – 
albeit without any one of them inhibiting the plan of another. Given this, Rawls believes 
that the most appropriate conception of justice for governing such a society is a social 
contract conception to which all of its members would willingly agree. In his words, the 
appropriate principles of justice are ―the principles that free and rational persons 
concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as 
defining the fundamental terms of their association‖ (TJ 10).  
 However, determining such principles will not be simply a matter of aggregating 
the preferences of the parties concerned. While Rawls‘s broad concern is to provide an 
answer to the fundamental question of political philosophy, his method is to explicitly 
contrast his justice as fairness with utilitarianism, which he takes to have been the day‘s 
prevailing conception of justice (TJ 3). He rejects utilitarianism for two reasons. First, it 
gives insufficient attention to the importance of the individual. Although utilitarianism is 
egalitarian in that it places no more value on the preferences of any one person than those 
of any other, it is insufficiently attentive to the individual in that it will willingly subsume 
the good of some smaller group of individuals to the good of a larger group if the 
resulting balance of preferences is sufficiently high.  
 A second ground for Rawls‘s rejection of utilitarianism applies to, but is hardly 
                                                 
5
 With a notable exception: adults who have  (for example) suffered brain damage or experience severe 
forms of mental retardation may never be able to develop these capacities. Here, however, is yet another – 
quite interesting, although for my purposes far less central – example of the ideal character of Rawls‘s 
theory. In his work, he brackets the question of mental and physical handicap, proceeding instead as if all 
citizens were within a certain normal range of physical and mental ability (See, for instance, TJ 83-84). 
Clearly Rawls appreciates that this will not actually be the case in a real society, but he leaves the question 
of these handicaps for nonideal theory. For some remarks on why this bracketing might nevertheless be 
problematic, see Farrelly 2007. 
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exclusive to, that doctrine. All other things being equal, when choosing the principles that 
govern our lives, each of us would usually prefer a principle that benefited us more to one 
that benefited us less. In a utilitarian system, the right or the justice of a course of action 
will depend upon the likelihood that it will bring about the greatest aggregate happiness 
of those involved. The happiness of each individual will be based upon the preferences of 
that individual, which will themselves be based upon the position which that individual 
occupies in society. A principle of justice chosen in this situation, then, will be quite 
sensitive to the self-interested motives of those who would prefer to see their own 
position in society benefited.  
 In justice as fairness, Rawls seeks to correct both of these utilitarian 
shortcomings: its insufficient attention to the individual, and its willingness to make 
principles of justice contingent upon the societal positions of those choosing them. To 
counteract the first of these problems, he stipulates that the principles of justice must be 
ones to which not simply the majority, but all of the members of the contract party can 
reasonably agree. Given Rawls‘s conception of the person, he has already accepted a 
democratic regime as his basic starting point. However, his conception of the person 
entails further that an acceptable democracy cannot be a simple case of majority rule. 
Rather, it must balance equality and liberty so that each individual in that society retains 
the proper space to exercise her two moral powers (her respective capacities for a 
conception of the good and a sense of justice). Rawls holds that these values are implicit 
in the public culture of any functioning democracy, and that the best way of explicitly 
working them out is to see society as a fair system of social cooperation over time (JF 5). 
In such a society, citizens do not merely allow others to pursue their own plans of the 
good – by engaging in social cooperation, they actually enhance the ability of others to 
pursue these plans, as they enhance their own at the same time.  
To address the second short-coming of utilitarianism, Rawls conceives of a 
thought experiment to help the members of the contract party to choose principles of 
justice which are not colored by their societal positioning and so are appropriate to 
society as a fair system of cooperation. This thought experiment is comprised of two 
major parts: the original position and the veil of ignorance. 
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Rawls adopts the convention of the original position because he is concerned that 
the principles of justice should be chosen by individuals who are equal parties to the 
contract.
6
 If some members were to hold a position of high prestige, or to wield great 
economic power, then those members‘ contributions to the discussion could well hold 
disproportionate weight. We should note that this disproportionate weight need not be 
coercive for it to distort the agreement reached in the original position: since all of the 
parties involved in the contract discussion are thought to possess the two moral powers, it 
will not do for some members to be silenced out of awe or respect any more than out of 
fear. Principles meant to regulate society from now into the future are too important to be 
affected by ―contingent historical advantages and accidental influences‖ (JF 16). To 
avoid these contingencies, Rawls imagines the principles of justice to be decided upon in 
an ahistorical ―original position‖ in which the parties to the contract are situated outside 
of society. The original position, then, is meant to ensure the equality of the parties at the 
time of their decision upon the principles of justice. 
However, there is also a more forward-looking reason to remove the question of 
societal position from the forming of the contract. Although parties in the original 
position are situated outside of society in order to choose the principles of justice, they 
are nevertheless choosing for the society in which they themselves would live, and they 
recognize that in that society they would hold a determinate social position. However, 
just as we cannot have certain parties wielding excessive influence in the original 
position, we can also not have parties motivating for principles of justice which would 
disproportionately benefit them in the determinate positions which they will eventually 
fill. For this reason, Rawls introduces a ―veil of ignorance‖ which prevents the 
representatives in the original position from knowing the specifics of the society that they 
will enter or their position in it (TJ 118). Fairness is, for Rawls, one of the convictions 
implicit in the public culture of a democracy: we know that ―the fact that we occupy a 
                                                 
6
 Recall that Rawls emphasizes the free and rational nature of the parties in a way that other contract 
positions do not. Consider the contrast, for example, between the social contract of Rawls and that of 
Hobbes, in which the equality of the parties is immaterial, and the justice of the contract is based upon its 
continuing ability to effectively shield its member parties from the state of nature. For more on Hobbes‘s 
social contract, see Leviathan. Rawls contract is novel, then, in that it is only just if it results from the 
uncoerced assent of those who stand on an equal footing with one another. 
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particular social position, say, is not a good reason for us to accept, or to expect others to 
accept, a conception of justice that favors those in that position‖ (JF 18). Nevertheless, he 
also recognizes that, while we may affirm this conviction abstractly, it is rather harder to 
live our lives in this way. In strict matter of fact, we must ―nullify the effects of specific 
contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural 
circumstances to their own advantage‖ (TJ 118). The veil of ignorance, then, is 
implemented in order to remove all temptation to stack the principles of justice in favor 
of some members of society. Since each party behind the veil of ignorance realizes that 
she could enter into society in either the least or most advantaged position, she will want 
the principles of justice to promote fairness and the ability to pursue a rational plan of life 
in whichever position she might take up. In contrast to the original position, which 
ensures that past inequalities will not affect the principles of justice chosen, the veil of 
ignorance ensures that considerations of future disparities in resources and social position 
will not either cause the chosen principles of justice to disproportionately benefit one 
segment of society.   
In the end, Rawls offers the following principles as those which would be reached 
by parties behind a veil of ignorance in the original position who are free and rational 
agents and are searching for the best principles to govern society as a fair system of 
cooperation over time: 
(1) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of 
liberties for all; and 
(2) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to 
be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society (JF 42-43). 
 
So we should recognize that the principles of justice and the way in which they 
are arrived at are ideal in at least this way. The original position and the veil of ignorance, 
which yield the principles that Rawls endorses, are both thought experiments, which, 
while they are useful ways of thinking about the generation of principles of justice, are 
not positions into which we could actually enter. While they may be appropriate given 
 17 
the normative picture painted of the implicit convictions of a democracy‘s public culture, 
there is some question as to how deeply and widely these convictions hold in the 
democracies of our actual world. Rawls‘s theory is ideal in this sense in that choosing its 
principles requires that we accept convictions which may not effectively motivate us in 
the actual world in which we live. Choosing as we are now, these convictions may well 
be absent, and our resulting principles are likely to look very different – perhaps more 
like the utilitarian principles which Rawls hopes to replace. Although this sort of ideality 
of theory is not the one that primarily concerns Rawls (to this second sort we will turn in 
the next section), it is one that we must bear centrally in mind when, in Chapter 3, we 
consider the tension between Rawls‘s emphasis on ideal theory and his emphasis on 
hope.  
 
Ideal theory and its distance from our world: a well-ordered society 
 The sort of ideal theory on which Rawls concentrates is the one which applies to 
the persons and society which are to be governed by justice as fairness. The principles of 
justice are ideal in that they are meant to apply only to a well-ordered society. When 
Rawls first presents the idea of a well-ordered society, he stipulates that it must meet the 
following conditions: a well-ordered society must be governed by a set of rules designed 
to advance the good of its members, and it must be effectively regulated by a public sense 
of justice (TJ 4). This regulation has two sub-conditions: first, everyone in the society 
must accept and know that others accept the same conception of justice. Second, the basic 
social institutions of that society must generally satisfy – and generally be known to 
satisfy – the conception of justice publicly accepted by its people. 
We should note, however, that these conditions for a well-ordered society do not 
themselves entail the sorts of principles of justice which Rawls endorses. Consider first 
that the rules which govern a society must be designed to advance the good of all of its 
members. Although the good concerned must be the good of all of those who take part in 
the system, this condition alone does not preclude a society governed by a heavy 
paternalism. It seems that a benevolent dictatorship could quite conceivably advance the 
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good of the people, if good were understood without reference to autonomy or its related 
concepts. But clearly this would not be acceptable in a constitutional democratic society, 
which is the kind of society which Rawls‘s justice as fairness is aimed to govern. The 
same complaint can be made about effective regulation by a public sense of justice. Here 
as well, a paternalistic but benevolent authority could dictate the terms of justice which 
governed a society without its ―well-ordered‖ status being violated in any way. The point 
is that, although Rawls‘s theory of justice only applies to a well-ordered society, neither 
of the conditions for a well-ordered society nor the two conditions taken together 
presuppose or necessitate that a well-ordered society be the sort of society which would 
be governed by Rawls‘s theory of justice – in other words, a well-ordered society need 
not be a democracy. This need not be problematic, however. It is the content of the 
conception of justice in question which will limit the sort of governmental structure 
acceptable in a well-ordered society. In this case it is only necessary for ideal theory that 
the principles of justice as fairness apply to, not that they spring from, a well-ordered 
society.  
For a well-ordered society to be the sort of democracy which could be governed 
by Rawls‘s theory of justice, at least two stipulations must be made. First, it must be a 
democracy, and not some sort of authoritarian state. This is because personhood for 
Rawls is defined by possession of the two moral powers.
7
 Any system which refused 
citizens a role in governmental decision making would deny the importance of allowing 
persons the chance to exercise the first of these – their capacity to form a plan of the 
good. Second, the condition of effective regulation would have to be somewhat thicker. 
Here, it would require something more than embodiment by institutions and acceptance 
by citizens of the conception of justice. ―Acceptance‖ must be made into a thicker 
concept which includes the right sort of motivation to be governed by that conception.
8
 
And indeed, later in A Theory of Justice, Rawls clarifies that societal regulation by a 
                                                 
7
 Or at the very least some relationship to the capacity for these powers. Requiring possession of the 
powers in order to attribute personhood raises all sorts of complex questions about the personhood of 
young children, individuals with brain damage, etc.  
8
 Motivation by force or brainwashing, or motivation only in situations where complying with the 
conception furthers one‘s own self interests, for example, are examples of motivation for the wrong 
reasons. 
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public conception ―implies that its members have a strong and normally effective desire 
to act as the principles of justice require‖ (TJ 398). A thinner version of acceptance could 
allow for a significant number of citizens to publicly accept the principles of justice as 
both reasonable and rational, but still recognize that violating those principles would 
prove personally beneficial in many instances. In this case, the society in question would 
be left with a significant free-rider problem, and any attribution of ―well-ordered‖ status 
would seem ridiculous.   
 Clearly, the conditions of the well-ordered society to which Rawls‘s principles of 
justice are meant to apply are highly idealized. Our concern in this case is no longer that 
the principles of justice are reached only via a thought experiment into which we could 
not in practice enter – our concern is now that our world is lacking many of the 
characteristics that would make these principles effectively regulative. First of all, it is 
not the case that all members of our society accept the same conception of justice. As we 
noted before, a libertarian and a social democrat will have very different ideas of what 
appropriate justice ought to be. Second, even if everyone were to accept the same 
conception, people – a great number of them, if not perhaps the majority – may well not 
be sufficiently motivated to act on the corresponding principles. And third, since we do 
not have a single publicly shared conception of justice, it should go without saying that 
our basic social institutions do not satisfy the requirements that any such conception 
might have. Quite simply, our actual world is not one in which well-ordered societies 
exist. This sense of ideality, and the distance between a society to which justice as 
fairness could apply and our own, must also be central to our thoughts about the tension 
between ideal theory and hope in Rawls's work.    
 
Nonideal theory: transition 
 Since well-ordered societies – the primary subjects of Rawls's ideal theory – do 
not exist in our actual world, let us turn to the sort of theory that concerns itself with the 
relationship between that sort of ideal world and our own. This is the second form of 
nonideal theory: that of transition. For Rawls, although ideal theory does not apply to the 
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world in which we live, ideal theory is nevertheless a prerequisite for the nonideal theory 
which might so apply: 
A conception of justice must specify the requisite structural principles and point 
to the overall direction of political action. In the absence of such an ideal form for 
background institutions, there is no rational basis for continually adjusting the 
social process so as to preserve background justice, nor for eliminating existing 
injustice. This ideal theory, which defines a perfectly just basic structure, is a 
necessary compliment to nonideal theory without which the desire for change 
lacks an aim (PL 285). 
 
Nonideal theory as transition, then, is the working out of how we might transform our 
own unjust world by finding ―policies and courses of action that are morally permissible 
and politically possible as well as likely to be effective‖ (LP 89). Unlike nonideal theory 
as partial compliance theory, this sort of nonideal theory as transition ought ultimately to 
make itself redundant; when we have attained (as closely as possible) the sort of just 
basic structure that ideal theory defines, the questions of nonideal theory as transition will 
be much less central, if not altogether irrelevant. However, for Rawls, we cannot 
coherently undertake the sort of project that nonideal theory as transition entails without 
first setting for ourselves a goal worth reaching.
9
 Setting this goal is the work of ideal 
theory, and the necessity of the goal serves as Rawls‘s justification for concentrating his 
work in the ideal realm to the detriment of the nonideal.  
 
Ideal theory and stability 
 At this point, we should have seen enough to know that Rawls‘s ideal theory at its 
most basic level takes very seriously the facts of at least some real world. From the very 
beginning, his ideal theory took into account the facts of human nature, the need for 
corresponding partial compliance theory, and the other general limiting facts of human 
societies. However, as his work progresses onwards from A Theory of Justice, he begins 
                                                 
9
 Of course, this will also be the case for nonideal theory as partial compliance theory. However, this 
modeling of ideal theory will effect the two kinds of nonideal theory in different ways. Nonideal theory as 
transition will take its goal from ideal theory in order to make itself redundant. Nonideal theory as partial 
compliance theory will take its goal from ideal theory in order to serve as a damage control mechanism 
which will never stop being necessary. 
 21 
to take these constraints even more seriously. By 1995, when he wrote Political 
Liberalism, he had significantly reworked justice as fairness to account for the 
importance of the real-world condition of stability. 
 It is in Political Liberalism that Rawls first explicitly recognizes that democratic 
societies are centrally characterized by what he calls ―the fact of reasonable pluralism‖ 
(PL 36). This is the fact that within any society in which equal liberty of conscience is 
recognized and affirmed, individual citizens are bound to call upon different religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines when they attempt to formulate their separate rational 
plans of the good. When these doctrines are comprehensive – that is, when they go 
beyond considering questions of the good narrowly applicable to the shared political 
realm, and instead include ―conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of 
personal character, as well as ideals of familial and associational relationships, and much 
else of what is to inform our conduct‖ (PL 13) – they are bound to conflict with one 
another. There are simply too many legitimate ways of answering these questions for all 
of us to settle finally upon the same one. So long as I affirm one particular 
comprehensive doctrine as true, I will be unable to affirm at least several of the other 
conflicting comprehensive doctrines that I find around me as similarly true. 
 The fact of reasonable pluralism becomes problematic when we recognize the 
importance of stability to any political conception. A just regime that could not sustain 
itself and would pass immediately away would provide a poor answer for specifying, as 
the fundamental question of political philosophy asks us to do, the terms of fair 
cooperation between free and equal citizens. If a conception is really to be the most 
appropriate for this task, it must also answer to the further condition: that such a scheme 
be the most appropriate over time. In other words, the most appropriate conception must 
be one which is stable over time. In Rawls‘s words, this means that ―in order to be stable, 
a political conception of justice must generate its own support and the institutions to 
which it leads must be self-supporting‖ (JF 125).  
With this new consideration in mind, Rawls changes his focus from the 
fundamental question of political philosophy to the fundamental question of political 
liberalism: ―How is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free 
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and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines?‖ (PL 4). In answering this question, we must take 
into account both the fact of reasonable pluralism and the importance that Rawls places 
on stability, and we should see quite quickly that a democratic society could not be stably 
governed by any one comprehensive doctrine. Since each possible comprehensive 
doctrine conflicts with several others, no single one of them could satisfactorily govern 
all citizens. And since there would be so much dissent among the population, no single 
comprehensive doctrine could generate its own support broadly enough to sustain itself 
and remain stable. 
 For this reason, having recognized that his own justice as fairness as presented in 
A Theory of Justice was comprehensive in this way, in Political Liberalism Rawls rejects 
that comprehensive doctrine for a narrower new political doctrine of justice as fairness. 
This political conception has three elements: first, a political conception applies only to 
the ―basic structure‖ of society – to its ―main political, social, and economic institutions, 
and how they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation from one 
generation to the next‖ (PL 11). In other words, the political conception only regulates 
the basic structure which assures citizens the rights, liberties, and basic goods that they 
need to pursue their own private projects and conceptions of the good. The political 
conception of justice is not instructive when it comes to the directions that these private 
projects themselves ought to take.  
 The second and third features of a political conception of justice go together. In 
the second case, the political conception is not derived from any one comprehensive 
view, or from a mixture of several. Instead, it is a freestanding view which presents the 
principles of justice by which any rational and reasonable
10
 person should choose in the 
original position to be governed. Any reasonable comprehensive doctrine ought to be 
compatible with such a political conception. This is because a comprehensive doctrine 
which is reasonable must by definition recognize equal liberty of conscience and the 
                                                 
10
 These terms are importantly different, though related. A rational actor is one who acts to advance her 
own good. A reasonable person, on the other hand, recognizes the similar claim of others to pursue their 
own good, and so abides by the rules of justice and the fair terms of cooperation to which all would agree, 
even when doing so is to the detriment of her own interests (JF 6-7). 
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prerogative of other citizens to pursue their own rational plans of the good.
11
 The political 
conception, however, is able to accommodate all of these reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines because it does not try to answer, as those various doctrines might, all questions 
of value and of human good in society. The third, and complimentary characteristic of a 
political conception of justice is that its content is derived from, rather than foreign to, the 
public political culture of a democracy: ―In a democratic society, there is a tradition of 
democratic thought, the content of which is at least familiar and intelligible to the 
educated common sense of citizens generally‖ (PL 14). These three features, taken 
together, make it a conception that can gain the support of an overlapping consensus 
between the reasonable comprehensive doctrines in question. Since it comes from none 
of these comprehensive doctrines but is drawn from ideas familiar to all, and since it 
applies only to the basic structure which makes the expression of all of these doctrines 
possible, all comprehensive doctrines which are reasonable should be happy to affirm the 
political doctrine.  
 It is perhaps conceivable that we could create some sort of stability in a society 
without relying upon a political conception of justice – but we could not do so in a 
democratic society. If stability under one comprehensive doctrine could be possible at all, 
it would be so only through the violent and forceful imposition of that doctrine upon the 
people. Rawls calls this ―the fact of oppression‖ (PL 37). (Imagine, for example, fascist 
Germany or the Spain of the Inquisition.) Although such ―stable governing‖ might be 
possible, the factors for its possibility clearly preclude democratic government and equal 
liberty of conscience.  
 Even if, by some fluke or accident, a society could exist which could be governed 
by a single comprehensive doctrine (such as justice as fairness in its original form as a 
comprehensive view) which all shared, this should not be our ultimate hope. There are 
numerous sources of reasonable disagreement (which Rawls calls ―the burdens of 
judgment‖12) about the facts of even the deepest and most important matters that we must 
consider in our lives. If citizens are to consider for themselves the issues that they 
                                                 
11
 Recall that some comprehensive doctrines will not be reasonable ones. See footnote 2. 
12
 For a full list of the burdens of judgment, see pages 35-36 in Justice as Fairness. 
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encounter, in the service of their own pursuits and plans of the good, rather than rely 
upon some authority, then these burdens of judgment will invariably lead to reasonable 
pluralism. As Rawls says, reasonable pluralism is ―the natural outcome of the activities of 
human reason under enduring free institutions. To see reasonable pluralism as a disaster 
is to see the exercise of reason under the conditions of freedom itself as a disaster‖ (PL 
xxiv). And in a society in which the two moral powers
13
 are the constituent parts of the 
normative conception of the person, such an outcome can hardly be seen as a disaster.  
 If stability is so important in the selection of a conception of justice, then the fact 
of reasonable pluralism demands that we choose a conception which people can in fact 
support. In the end, stability is a make-it or break-it condition for a Rawlsian conception 
of justice; if the principles chosen in the original position do not in fact prove to lead to 
stability when they are applied to a real society, then the project of choosing in the 
original position must begin anew. Since the facts of the real world would not allow 
justice as fairness as a comprehensive doctrine on these grounds, the facts of the real 
world and the importance of stability there necessitate its transformation into a political 
conception.   
 
Stability and realizability  
 We have seen that stability is important enough to Rawls to cause him to rework 
one of the most central components of his theory of justice. But what exactly is the place 
of stability in Rawls‘s work? Although he does not explicitly say so, I take it that Rawls‘s 
emphasis on stability is part of his answer to the feasibility debate. This is because 
stability, for Rawls, works in the service of realizability.
14
 Rawls‘s reason for rejecting 
his comprehensive doctrine of justice as fairness in favor of a political doctrine is that ―as 
used in Theory, the idea of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness is unrealistic. This 
is because it is inconsistent with realizing its own principles under the best of foreseeable 
conditions‖ (PL xvii). In other words, the original version of a well-ordered society, 
                                                 
13
 Again, the capacity for a sense of the good and the capacity for a sense of justice. 
14
 Recall from the introduction that I use feasibility and realizability interchangeably. 
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based as it was in a comprehensive doctrine of justice as fairness, is not the sort of thing 
that we can have in any sort of real world – because it cannot be stable, it cannot be 
realizable.
15
  
Of course, it is not strictly true that in order to be realized a concept must also be 
stable. An unstable concept could perhaps be realized for a short time and then pass 
swiftly from existence. But this sort of concept will not be realizable in the way in which 
it must be to answer the fundamental question of political liberalism. Recall that this 
question requires us to explain ―how it is possible for there to exist over time a just and 
stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines‖ (PL 4, my italics). So, while realizability 
may be a feature of many different sorts of conceptions, political and otherwise, the term 
―realizability‖ as used in this thesis will only refer to a feature of political conceptions 
which allows them to effectively answer this question.  
 It is clear, then, that realizability is a central and nonnegotiable condition for an 
acceptable Rawlsian theory of justice. If Rawls rejected his own theory because of 
questions of stability which were themselves fueled by the concern of realizability, then 
we must be open to the idea that other failures of realizability in his final conception 
would similarly call for major reworking of the theory. 
 Presumably, there are numerous ways in which a proposed society could fail to be 
realizable. However, I will be concerned with only one of them here. Recall that for the 
conditions of a well-ordered society to be met, it must be the case that its ―members have 
a strong and normally effective desire to act as the principles of justice require‖ (TJ 398). 
Recall further that to meet the stability requirement, that effective desire to act must 
reinforce itself over time: it must ―generate its own support and the institutions to which 
it leads must be self-supporting‖ (JF 125). Since stability is a requirement of realizability, 
a conception of justice which did not meet stability's own requirements would, on 
Rawlsian grounds, be unacceptable. If justice as fairness, then, were not able to meet the 
stability condition, then it would be unrealizable as well, and would need to be reworked 
accordingly. 
                                                 
15
 Stability, then, will be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for realizability. 
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I think that, if we were to apply these two requirements to our own actual world, 
they would not be met. It seems uncontroversial to claim that at least the majority of our 
worlds‘ citizens do not have either a strong or normally effective desire to act on the 
principles of justice, and if this sort of inclination on the part of the population does exist, 
then it is clear that the population will not create self-supporting just institutions. Applied 
to a current real-world society, then, justice as fairness would fail to meet the stability 
and realizability conditions, and so would need to be reworked.  
 
Stability limited to a well-ordered society 
But Rawls is not concerned with our real-world society. He has considered the 
possibility of a population in which the appropriate sense of justice obtains, and he feels 
that it is not unrealistic to imagine that this sort of society might obtain. After all, he is 
working with an idealized conception of human beings and of the basic structure which 
would influence their formative years. According to him, if citizens grow up in a 
basically just society, then they ought to automatically acquire the desire to be governed 
by the appropriate conception of justice:  
The idea is that, given certain assumptions specifying a reasonable human 
psychology and the normal conditions of human life, those who grow up under 
just basic institutions – institutions that justice as fairness itself enjoins – acquire a 
reasoned and informed allegiance to those institutions sufficient to render them 
stable. Put another way: citizens‘ sense of justice, given their character and 
interests as formed by living under a just basic structure, is strong enough to resist 
the normal tendencies to injustice. Citizens act willingly to give one another 
justice over time. Stability is secured by sufficient motivation of the appropriate 
kind acquired under just institutions. (JF 185).  
 
Since Rawls‘s philosophical project is only concerned with ideal theory, it seems perhaps 
acceptable for him to make that leap. If (as would be the case in the sort of society 
described by his ideal theory) individuals were raised by parents who wholeheartedly 
endorsed and were sincerely motivated by the common sense of justice which was shared 
in their community and embodied in their institutions, then those individuals may well be 
similarly motivated to give each other justice and avoid injustice. Since the emphasis in 
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Rawls‘s work is on whether justice as fairness could regulate a well-ordered society, and 
not on whether it could regulate our own, the question of stability in our current 
circumstances need not be an issue for him. It follows from this that, if his assumptions 
about the possibility of this world of ideal theory are correct, he has met the realizability 
condition as far as he needs to.  
 
Realizability and realization 
 I am skeptical, however, that realizability ought to be where Rawls‘s concern with 
the real world ends. There is, after all, the further issue of realization. Thomas Pogge, in a 
discussion of Rawls, suggests that ―the point of political philosophy is not merely to 
show that certain principles are true, but to make them true by motivating the struggle for 
their gradual implementation‖ (Pogge 1989: 6). This claim seems to me to be correct, at 
least in the context of a certain kind of political philosophy. Returning to Plato‘s ideally 
just city, it is clear that this kind of political philosophy is unconcerned with either the 
possibility or the project of motivating much change in the real world. In other words, it 
is unconcerned with both realizability and realization. Rawls‘s own sort of political 
philosophy, however, is concerned at least with realizability – and in order to ask whether 
it ought also to be concerned with realization, I think that we must ask ourselves just how 
this concern with realizability is motivated.  
 Although Rawls‘s work is primarily in ideal theory, as we have seen, he 
nevertheless recognizes in at least some sense that there is another vital part to our 
political philosophy. He says that ―the task is to articulate a public conception of justice 
that all can live with who regard their person and their relation to society in a certain way. 
And though doing this may involve settling theoretical difficulties, the practical task is 
primary‖ (KCMT 519). This is not a question of discovering truth – it is a very practical 
and concrete question about the best ways in which real people really can live their lives.  
 It is well and good, then, to say that ideal theory provides the appropriate aim for 
nonideal theory, and that the former must be worked out before we can consider the 
latter. But this does not seem to me to be enough. Although Nicholas Ferriera‘s primary 
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concern is determining feasibility (rather than bringing about the realization of principles 
of justice, as mine is) I think that he is right to question the sort of stability that Rawls 
makes his theory‘s acceptability conditional upon. Ferriera thinks that Rawls pays too 
high a price when he makes such serious modifications to justice as fairness on the basis 
of the sorts of assurances about stability that ideal theory can give us. Says Ferriera, ―If 
stability is desirable in politics, it seems at least plausible that only actual stability is 
desirable, especially if substantial costs must be incurred to obtain it‖ (Ferriera 86). It 
seems to me right to say that, if we turn our thoughts on justice to the sort of justice that 
people could agree to be governed by, we should also turn them to the sort of justice that 
people would agree to be governed by, and that we should concern ourselves as well with 
seeing that we do what we can to bring such a conception of justice about.  
 Indeed, although Rawls‘s work remains primarily in ideal theory, I do not think 
that he would do well to content himself with realizability in an ideal society, and to 
leave aside questions both of realizability and realization in our own world. In fact, on 
Rawls‘s own terms, I think that there is great reason for him (and generally for the strand 
of political philosophy which carries on his legacy) to attend to these problems. To 
defend this claim, however, I will need to examine the central roles that Rawls proposes 
for political philosophy. Understanding why these roles entail that concerns of 
realizability must lead us to further concerns of realization will be the task of the next two 
chapters. 
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Chapter 2: The Roles of Political Philosophy 
 
 At the end of the last chapter I suggested that if we are to take Rawls‘s theory 
seriously, then we as political philosophers should be as concerned with realization as we 
are with realizability. Although, as we shall see, Rawls maintains until the end that ideal 
theory, and its corresponding concern with realizability, should appropriately remain the 
subject of his political philosophy, I think that his later work only gives us increasing 
reason to believe precisely the opposite. There more than ever it should become clear that 
meeting the conditions of realizability cannot be the final aim of political philosophy.  
 
The four central roles of political philosophy 
Rawls proposed his theory of justice as an attempt to remedy the shortcomings of 
the political philosophy that had come before it. He recognized the great need for revision 
in the discipline, but recognized as well that aimless revision would be useless. In the 
content of that theory, recall that Rawls held that nonideal theory could not be left to 
wander aimlessly without ideal theory to provide the goal toward which the former must 
work. Taking a step back, the need for the revision of that theory must also be guided by 
something beyond itself. At the beginning of his final work, Justice as Fairness, Rawls 
finally spells out four central roles of the discipline of political philosophy. I take it that  
his own theory, if it is to be acceptable, must also fulfill these roles. 
 
The practical function 
 This is the role of political philosophy with which Rawls begins, and it may be 
tempting to see it as the discipline‘s primary role, since the other three are only ―noted 
briefly‖ (JF 2). I have questions, which I will address shortly, about which of these roles 
ought to take precedence, but the practical role of political philosophy is certainly vitally 
important, whether or not it trumps the others.  
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 The practical role of political philosophy arises from the reality in our world of 
―divisive political conflict and the need to settle the problem of order‖ (JF 1). According 
to Rawls, it ought to solve these problems by attending to the ―deeply disputed questions‖ 
at issue, and finding, if possible, ―some underlying basis of philosophical and moral 
agreement‖ (JF 2). To illustrate this role of political philosophy, Rawls references the 
debates between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists over the ratification of the US 
Constitution, as well as the discussions of slavery as an institution and of the appropriate 
relationship of the North and South that occurred before the US Civil War.  
Rawls mentions these cases without providing much discussion around them. Yet 
these strike me as interesting examples for Rawls to have chosen because, while the first 
of them seems to be an instance of political philosophy successfully filling its practical 
role, the second seems much more like a failed attempt. In the first case, the Anti-
Federalists initially strongly opposed and refused to ratify the US Constitution which the 
Federalists had proposed as the governing document of the new United States of 
America. Instead, they supported the Articles of the Confederation, which called for a 
smaller Federal government and placed the bulk of political power squarely in the hands 
of the individual states. Despite the deep commitments of each group, however, a string 
of conventions and a public exchange of views (which led, roughly to both the Federalist 
Papers and The Anti-Federalist Papers) led to successful compromise. Both groups were 
ultimately willing to ratify a Constitution with an attached Bill of Rights which was 
meant to limit the power of the Federal Government and assure the protection of 
individual liberties. In the second case, however, such a common ground could not be 
reached. The southern Confederacy refused to consider the abolition of slavery, and 
wanted to separate themselves from the United States of America as it stood, while the 
northern Union demanded both abolition and the continuance of the Union between 
North and South. In this case, the conflict proved intractable, and these deep 
disagreements led to the US Civil War.      
It is worth exploring for a moment why this second example of practical political 
philosophy might have failed. The divisive political conflict to which political philosophy 
is meant to attend lies at the intersection of real, particular, and opposed positions. 
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However, the search for political and moral agreement which Rawls offers as the solution 
to that conflict may have to be extremely vague if it is to represent a true common ground 
between the parties involved. Rawls himself acknowledges this. He notes that, since ―of 
course our judgments will not coincide on all questions, and in fact many if not most 
social issues may still be insoluble, especially if viewed in their full complexity‖, we 
must acknowledge and support the ―many simplifications of justice as fairness‖ (TJ 453). 
It may be the case that such agreement can only be reached if the full complexities of the 
question are left out, but it is certainly worth asking how useful these impoverished 
agreements will be in solving the real conflicts out of which the need to seek agreement 
initially rose. In the case of discussions about slavery and the union of the states, which 
nevertheless ended in war, it seems that whatever agreement that could have been 
reached would not have been enough. A conception to which both parties could have 
genuinely agreed would have been too vague to aid in reaching a real-world solution. 
This is not to say that political philosophy should not fill this practical role, nor is it to 
say that attempting to find common moral and philosophical ground is an inappropriate 
or useless endeavor. It is merely to say that finding this agreement, if it is in the case in 
question so vague, will not be enough. Political philosophy may well need to join forces 
with other disciplines in order to fulfill its practical role in these cases.  
 
Orientation 
 The second role which Rawls suggests is that of orientation. In this case, political 
philosophy ought to help us to think of ourselves as more than individuals contingently 
involved in the governing of a nation. Instead, it should help us to see ourselves as 
members of a society with central common aims and goals. Rawls says that it is a 
necessity for us to see ourselves as members of a democracy with the political status of 
equal citizens, for recognition of this status will fundamentally change our orientation in 
respect to our social world. Once we see each other as members in a common project, we 
may be offered a ―unified framework within which proposed answers to divisive 
questions can be made consistent and the insights gained from different kinds of cases 
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can be brought to bear on one another and extended to other cases‖ (JF 3). This strikes 
me as perhaps a second way in which we could understand the political philosophy which 
proceeded the Civil War to have failed. It seems plausible that subgroups within a 
society, as well as individuals, can be oriented toward that society. The member states of 
the Confederacy, at least, no longer saw themselves as engaged in a common project with 
the member states of the Union. Although this certainly does not mean that the individual 
citizens involved saw themselves as individuals rather than as citizens of a larger society, 
it seems that they constituted their society very differently than did those individuals in 
the Union. Perhaps then, we can see this as a failure of political philosophy only in the 
case of the northern aim of remaining a single union.   
 
Reconciliation 
 In a rare poetic moment, Rawls tells us that the third role of political philosophy 
ought to be that of reconciling us to our social and political reality. In his words, it 
may try to calm our frustration and rage against our society and its history by 
showing us the way in which its institutions, when properly understood from a 
philosophical point of view, are rational, and developed over time as they did to 
attain their present, rational form (JF 3).  
 
In other words, we are to appreciate and engage with our political reality, understanding 
how it has changed and how it could change in the future through our participation. 
Above all, we must ―affirm our social world positively, and not merely … be resigned to 
it‖ (Ibid.). The Confederacy, then, was neither resigned to their political reality, nor 
willing to affirm that reality positively. Instead, they rejected their previous political 
reality, but recognizing that they could have a hand in forming their political future, 
moved to do so. While this was perhaps a failure for political philosophy in its 
reconciliatory role, the rebellion of the South (although perhaps not its final failure) may 
well be an illustration of the success of political philosophy in its final role: the 
realistically utopian one, to which we now turn.   
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Political philosophy as realistically utopian 
 Politically philosophy‘s realistically utopian role is to reconcile us to our future, 
much as its previous role is to reconcile us to our present. In addition to assuring us that 
our social reality is one which can reasonably be changed, realistically utopian 
philosophy is meant to give us hope that a better future can indeed be brought about. In 
Rawls‘s words, it ―probes the limits of practical political possibility‖ (JF 4). If it does its 
job correctly, political philosophy should allow us the justified hope not only that our 
society can be different, but that we can imagine the particulars of a more just society that 
could indeed exist in the world. Hope for the future of our society is intimately connected 
with our beliefs about the world. More specifically, this hope ―rests on the belief that the 
social world allows at least a decent political order, so that a reasonably just, although not 
perfect, democratic regime is possible‖ (Ibid.). In order to give us this hope, political 
philosophy must both consider the constraining conditions of the social world, and 
attempt to formulate the sorts of ideals and principles that such a society would try to 
realize.  
 
The import of these central roles 
 Outside of these pages, Rawls offers little pointed discussion of these roles of 
political philosophy. Yet I think that there are several reasons to take their articulation 
here particularly seriously. They are, first of all, the final and most explicit articulation of 
what Rawls takes the responsibilities of political philosophy to be. Although the 
transition of justice as fairness from a comprehensive to a political doctrine is the most 
obvious example of the scope of the changes in his work, Rawls also recognizes that 
there are a number of other ambiguities and contradictions which call for similar revision 
to his theory. Justice as Fairness was written with the explicit intention of ―presenting in 
one place an account of justice as fairness as (he) now (saw) it‖ (JF, xvi), in light of all of 
these necessary revisions. In other words, Rawls wrote Justice as Fairness in order to 
state his theory in a clear and unified way which took into account the positions of all of 
his former books and papers and presented the best, most coherent picture of his work as 
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a whole. Since it was the last piece which he wrote before he died, and since he took it to 
be a ―more or less self-contained‖ reformulation of his theory, we have reason to treat it 
as his final considered judgment on the matter. The roles of political philosophy with 
which he begins should be no exception.  
I think that these roles must be seen as noteworthy, however, in their content as 
well as in their context. These particular four roles provide one of the most solid 
groundings in practical concerns to be found anywhere in his work. All four roles of 
political philosophy relate crucially to society as a whole. Not a single one of them can be 
filled by deliberation that remains either purely theoretical or exclusively within the 
philosophical community. The practical role of political philosophy, after all, springs 
from ―divisive political conflict‖ and requires us to respond to the ―need to settle the 
problem‖ which arises from it (JF 1). The Civil War and the American Revolution are not 
the only examples which Rawls gives to illustrate this need. Instead, he discusses many 
concrete instances of the ―long periods in the history of any society during which certain 
basic questions lead to deep and sharp conflict‖ (Ibid.). The selection of these concrete 
examples makes it clear that Rawls means for political philosophy to address the 
problems that we actually find in our real world and in our histories. 
  While the practical role of political philosophy focuses on the real-world 
problems which we must solve, the roles of orientation and of reconciliation are related to 
the experience of the real-world citizens who make up our societies. Political philosophy 
will find itself a failure in each of these latter capacities if it succeeds in orienting and 
reconciling only political philosophers to their societies. The discipline cannot 
meaningfully do what it is meant to in the case of orientation – cannot ―contribute to how 
a people think of their political and social institutions as a whole, and their basic aims and 
purposes as a society with a history—a nation—as opposed to their aims and purposes as 
individuals‖ (JF 2) – if the majority of those who make up that people remain unaffected 
by the discipline‘s content. Nor can it do what reconciliation demands: it cannot ―calm 
our frustration and rage against our society and its history‖ (JF 3) if the proper 
understanding of the philosophical point of view which is meant to do this remains the 
purview of a few academics.  
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Finally, there is the realistically utopian role of political philosophy. It seems to 
me that the relationship between this final role and the practical world is, although the 
most complex, also the most important. I will address some of these complexities and 
difficulties below, but for now I wish to point out the importance of this final role. 
Although Rawls does not discuss the ways in which these roles might stand in 
relationship to one another, I find it useful to view them in a kind of hierarchy. 
Realistically utopian political philosophy must allow us to hope for a future which is 
importantly different from and better than our present. I think that we would do well to 
take this hope to provide a framework in which we can see all of these other roles of 
political philosophy as working in the service of the realistically utopian one. In order for 
us to have a better future, political philosophy must succeed in its practical role – we 
must find a way to solve the divisive political conflict which tears societies apart. In order 
for us to have a better future, political philosophy must also succeed in orienting us 
appropriately – if we want political and social change, we must see ourselves as citizens 
with the political equality, status, and relationship to one another which together allow us 
to work in concert for that change. And finally, in order for us to have a better future, 
political philosophy must succeed in reconciling us to our social world – in order for 
political and social change to be a possibility, we cannot merely be resigned to our social 
world as an unavoidable and undesirable fact. Instead, we must be able to affirm it as the 
positive outcome of a rational process. This in turn will allow us to see our shared 
political future as the superior outcome of continued rational processes. I suggest that we  
see the four together as creating a feedback system – progress in the first three areas 
provide us with the hope that constitutes the fourth, while the fourth, when acquired, 
encourages us to work to further the other three. We should recognize each of the first 
three as working in the service of creating what the fourth allows us to hope for.            
 
Realistic utopia 
 Let us place this fourth role of political philosophy in terms of the concepts 
discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. Rawlsian ideal theory, remember, is meant to 
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work out the principles of justice which could best govern a real society under the 
circumstances most hospitable to justice‘s correct functioning. In order to work out these 
principles, ideal theory must also concern itself with what these circumstances hospitable 
to justice‘s correct functioning are, and so, what a real society hospitable to justice might 
look like. It seems to me, then, that realistically utopian philosophy could have two 
possible (and not mutually exclusive) functions in respect to ideal theory: first, it could 
provide the content with which we describe and formulate these circumstances, 
principles, and societies. In other words, political philosophy could be realistically 
utopian in that it is used to determine the correct content of ideal theory. Second, 
realistically utopian political philosophy could serve as a bridging device between our 
own society and one which is described by ideal theory. Here, instead of providing the 
content for ideal theory, it would allow us to hope for the society which ideal theory 
describes. In this second case, it will be hard to say whether political philosophy‘s 
realistically utopian character makes it an instance of ideal or nonideal theory. It is clear, 
however, that this second relationship between the two concepts will leave realistically 
utopian political philosophy much more intimately linked to both ideal and nonideal 
theory than it would have been if its primary responsibility were the constitution of ideal 
theory.  
 Understanding the function of realistic utopia will be of vital importance in the 
attempt to understand what the task of political philosophy ought to be. As I will show 
later, Rawls takes the concept of realistic utopia to have served its purpose when it fills 
the first of these functions – that of providing the content of ideal theory. I will argue, 
however, that treating this function as sufficient is unacceptable. If realistic utopia 
remains in the realm of ideal theory, it will remain purely in the domain of philosophy. 
But as we have seen, none of the roles of political philosophy laid out by Rawls will be 
filled by philosophy which remains esoteric to the wider society. Before we can make a 
case, however, for either of these understandings of the function of realistically utopian 
philosophy, we must investigate further the concept of realistic utopia itself. 
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Realistic utopia is unlike other utopias 
 It may be that Rawls‘s choice of the phrase ―realistic utopia‖ was an unfortunate 
one. No only in philosophy, but in the other humanities and the social sciences as well, 
the concept of utopia has gained an unfavorable reputation. Orwell‘s 1984 and Huxley‘s 
Brave New World are only the most prominent of many literary examples of the dystopias 
to which utopian aspirations seem inevitably to lead. Philosophers‘ doubts about the 
practicability of real-world utopia make us question whether utopia could be a 
worthwhile goal at all. And the very real and tragic consequences of political revolution 
in the name of utopian Marxist thought have made political scientists wary of the value of 
utopian thinking in politics. I say that Rawls‘s choice of phrase may be unfortunate 
because the word ―utopia‖ brings to mind this slew of valid concerns which in the end are 
simply not relevant  to the way in which Rawls uses the concept. 
 Indeed, by ―utopian‖, Rawls means nothing more than drawing on ―political 
(moral) ideals, principles, and concepts to specify a reasonable and just society‖ (JF 14). 
Recall from the first chapter that Rawls is not interested in explicating a perfect 
conception of justice as it is laid out in heaven – he is interested in clarifying principles of 
justice that can govern real human beings in a real world. The central objections to the 
concept of utopia tend to share a common concern: namely, that utopias are impossible, 
and that serious attempts to achieve that impossibility will lead to authoritarian dystopias. 
Rawls‘s sense of utopia, however, is tempered by its ―realistic‖ modifier. This modifier 
requires that his proposals concern themselves with governing human beings as they 
could actually be governed, and ―utopia‖ itself only does the work of assuring that our 
realistic proposals be guided by considered ideals. Nevertheless, anti-utopian criticisms 
are serious ones, and I here attempt to show that what I take to be the three central such 
criticisms do not apply to Rawls‘s philosophy.  
 One of the major arguments against utopia in the real world is that a utopia must 
be a blueprint of an ideal society. Since this society is in every way ideal, it cannot 
change for the better – and if it cannot change for the better, it should follow that in order 
for it to remain a utopia, it cannot change at all. According to Northrop Frye,  
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considered as a final or definitive social ideal, the utopia is a static society; and 
most utopians have built-in safeguards against radical alterations. This feature 
gives it a somewhat forbidding quality to a reader not yet committed to it (Frye 
1965: 31). 
 
Of course, most societies have built-in safeguards to protect against radical alterations in 
their structure; however, most democracies, at least, also have structures for debating the 
merits and content of appropriate progress in that society, and for implementing these 
changes when they are endorsed. The problem with a utopia is that, in order for it to be a 
utopia, these sorts of changes must be precluded. This should indeed make any proponent 
of democracy critical of this sort of utopian thinking.  
 However, Rawls‘s ―utopia‖ in no way necessitates this sort of changelessness. 
Although Rawls means different things by the word ―utopia‖ when he uses it in different 
ways (the difficulties of this usage will be addressed below), the utopia which he 
advocates as a final social ideal is in no way a static society. His version of a realistic 
utopia is a reasonably just constitutional democracy. The modifier ―reasonably‖ reminds 
us that, even when we are guided by our political moral ideals, we will still be human 
beings so guided, and so even our best conceivable societies will still be somewhat 
imperfect. Further, the fact that Rawls‘s utopia is a democracy shows us that his utopia 
cannot be changeless. Although he is centrally committed to the stability of his realistic 
utopia, the 
stability of a conception does not imply that the institutions and practices of the 
well-ordered society do not alter. In fact, such a society will presumably contain 
great diversity and adopt different arrangements from time to time. In this context 
stability means that however institutions are changed, they still remain just or 
approximately so, these adjustments being called for by new social circumstances 
(TJ 458).  
 
We will always be living, changing creatures in a living and changing world. For us to 
remain concerned with utopia, then, cannot mean that we have reached a state of 
changeless perfection. Instead, it must mean that we remain constantly concerned with 
meeting the demands of justice as the world and the circumstances of our societies 
change around us.   
 A second major argument against utopia is that it would require a society unified 
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behind the same ideal of the good. As Karl Popper puts it, ―the Utopian approach can 
only be saved by the Platonic belief in one absolute and unchanging ideal‖ (Popper 1962: 
161). Rawls, however, endorses this criticism, and says that this sort of scenario is 
―utopian in the pejorative sense‖ (JF 188). As we saw in the first chapter of this thesis, 
Rawls takes this criticism so seriously that he fundamentally changes his entire theory of 
justice to account for it. Such a utopian conception would require all members of society 
to be united under a single comprehensive doctrine, and Rawls has recognized that this 
cannot be consistent with a free, democratic, well-ordered society. His switch to political 
rather than comprehensive liberalism, then, ensures that his realistic utopia will not fall 
prey to this same utopian objection.  
 The final central argument against utopia with which I will engage is that any 
utopia would require authoritarianism and violence in order to remain intact under what 
Rawls would call a single comprehensive doctrine. This objection recognizes that human 
beings will of necessity be less perfect than the utopia in which they could hypothetically 
live. Only a violent imposition of utopian ideals could preserve a society in which those 
ideals were followed. Lyman Tower Sargent tells us that ―force will be necessary either 
because people question the desirability of the utopia or because there is disharmony 
between the perfect blueprint and imperfect people‖ (Sargent 1982: 568-9). However, 
Rawls once again shares this criticism of this kind of utopian society. He refers to the 
following as the fact of oppression: ―a continued shared adherence to one comprehensive 
doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power, with all its official 
crimes and inevitable brutality  and cruelties‖ (JF 34). Clearly, he sees this sort of 
oppression as unacceptable in a democratic society. Luckily, however, the application of 
this criticism to Rawls‘s version of realistic utopia is rendered inappropriate in the same 
way as the last. If the shared comprehensive doctrine governing the utopia is rejected in 
favor of a political conception which allows all its members to privately affirm their own 
comprehensive doctrines, there will be no reason for the forced imposition of any 
comprehensive doctrine at all. Only the political conception will need to be accepted by 
the society‘s members, and this they will be willing to do because doing so allows them 
to pursue whichever doctrine they find most compelling in their own lives.  
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 Rawls‘s use of utopia then, does not damn his conception in the way that a 
traditional use of utopia would. However, the use of the term does in some cases obscure 
his meaning. I will now turn to a positive account of just what that meaning is.     
 
The ambiguity of realistic utopia 
 Rawls does not treat the concept of realistic utopia as a problematic one, but it 
seems to me that there are a number of severe obstacles to its clear presentation. I identify 
three such obstacles here. First, the only substantive treatments of the concept are found 
in The Law of Peoples and Justice as Fairness. Since The Law of Peoples concentrates on 
the relationship of justice as fairness to the international arena, and Justice as Fairness is 
meant to be a self-contained reformulation of his domestic theory, the differences 
between the concepts of realistic utopia used in a basically parallel way in both books are 
sometimes obscure. Moreover, Rawls engages far more extensively with the concept in 
The Law of Peoples, and the curious reader intent upon understanding realistic utopia in 
the domestic sphere must sometimes attempt to reapply the international treatment of the 
concept there in ways which Rawls may not have intended.  
Second, it is difficult to apply the concept across both context and time, since 
realistic utopia makes a fairly late debut in Rawls‘s work. Justice as Fairness and The 
Law of Peoples are not only the only books in which Rawls discusses realistic utopia – 
they are also the last two books which he wrote. Although Justice as Fairness is meant to 
be a comprehensive reformulation of his previous work in domestic justice, it offers a far 
less detailed account than the ones found in either the 1971 or the 1999 editions of A 
Theory of Justice. Anyone intent upon studying realistic utopia throughout Rawls‘s opus, 
then, must reapply that concept in two ways: on the one hand, she must apply the 
comments in The Law of Peoples to the domestic context, and those in Justice as 
Fairness  to the international one. On the other, she must attempt to apply the comments 
in both of these books to the far more extensive body of work published before the 
concept of realistic utopia was broached. Since fulfilling its realistically utopian role is, 
for Rawls, a central responsibility of political philosophy, it will surely be useful to study 
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A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism with this role in mind. Yet, without express 
mention of the phrase in either of these works, undertaking this task will once again 
require the reader to interpret some of these earlier works in ways perhaps unintended by 
Rawls. Nevertheless, even if Rawls might not approve of this stretching of the idea, 
engaging in the exercise will be useful and necessary in order to most fruitfully 
understand the concept of realistic utopia across the full spectrum of his publications. 
Although certain extensions may be inconsistent with particular elements of Rawls‘s 
other work, I will make every effort in my own work not to extend the concept in ways 
which violate the broader picture and implications of Rawls‘s project.   
Finally, understanding realistic utopia is problematic because there are at least 
three different ways of getting at the idea of realistic utopia: we can have realistically 
utopian philosophy, a realistic utopia itself, or philosophy which fulfills its realistically 
utopian role. For clarity‘s sake, I will refer to the last of these as realistically utopian 
philosophy*. All of these are put across in Rawls‘s work, although the relationship 
between them is never spelled out, and features of one conception do not always follow 
from the features of the others. All three of these understandings can also be found in 
both his domestic and his international treatment of realistic utopia. Let us consider these 
three possibilities now, since the one (or ones) on which we choose to focus will play an 
important part in the answer which we give to the question of the appropriate relationship 
between realistic utopia and ideal theory. 
 For a philosophical conception to be realistically utopian, Rawls states that it must 
meet three conditions.
16
 Although some of these conditions have been gestured to in the 
previous section, for clarity‘s sake, I will discuss them systematically here. The first and 
second of these are conditions which it must meet in order to be realistic, the third it must 
meet in order to be utopian. First, it must ―rely on the actual laws of nature and achieve 
the kind of stability those laws allow, that is, stability for the right reasons‖ (LP 12-13). 
In other words, if, given the laws of nature, it demands a sort of stability which cannot 
hold, it will not be realistic. Second, in order for a liberal political conception to be 
                                                 
16
 These conditions are essentially parallel in the domestic and international contexts. For a comparison of 
the two, see The Law of Peoples pp. 11-19.  
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realistic, it must have principles and precepts which are ―workable and applicable to 
ongoing political and social arrangements‖ (LP 13). This means that those principles and 
precepts may not be too unwieldy or abstract. Unlike the principle of utility, which asks 
us to make almost impossible calculations in order to determine appropriate courses of 
action, principles which are realistic must be applicable in a useful, if not necessarily 
straightforward manner. Yet this focus on the realistic does not make the conception 
political in the wrong way. As Chris Brown says, ―a realistic utopia is not a compromise 
between what is realistic and what is utopian; nothing has been compromised here‖ 
(Brown: 20). Rather, the utopian condition must also be met in its entirety. It is able to do 
this because the nature of Rawls's specific utopian requirement allows it to be  
complemented, rather than confined, by his conditions of realisticness. The requirement 
is that, in order to be utopian, a philosophical conception must employ ―political (moral) 
ideals, principles, and concepts to specify a reasonable and just society‖ (JF 14). This 
requirement can be met in its entirety because, once again, the contrast is against pure 
personal utility. A realistically utopian conception of justice must be based on principles 
and ideals which are endorsed on the basis of their moral merits, rather than on the 
contingent and transitory intersections which they might have with personal interest.  
 When Rawls discusses a realistic utopia itself, however, the concepts which he 
uses are importantly different. Here, realistic utopia, rather than referring to the 
conditions that a conception of justice must meet, refers to a reasonably just 
constitutional democracy (JF 17). In this case, in order to understand realistic utopia we 
must consider the characteristics which such a democracy can and must have. These will 
include, for example, the features of a well-ordered society, the requirement of persons 
seen as citizens with the two moral powers, and the condition of stability for the right 
reasons. In this sense, a realistic utopia will have specific conditions which can be spelled 
out. For instance, to ensure stability for the right reasons in such a regime, Rawls requires 
the following things of that society: a certain fair equality of opportunity; a decent 
distribution of income and wealth which allows citizens to take advantage of their basic 
freedoms; a government which is, or ensures through its policies that some other agent 
will be, employer of last resort; basic health care for all citizens; and a system which 
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ensures the public availability of information concerning policy and which publicly 
finances elections (JF 50). Here, even if the realistically utopian conception of justice 
described in the first sense of the term leads to a realistic utopia in this second sense – 
that of a reasonably just constitutional democracy – the features of the latter are certainly 
not necessitated by the features of the former alone. The extremely particular content 
found in the second conception of realistic utopia can not be derived from conditions as 
broad as those presented in the first conception.  
 Finally, the remaining way of conceiving of realistic utopia is even further 
removed from the former two than those two are from each other. This is the role of 
political philosophy which was discussed above. Here, rather than specifying particular 
conditions for a philosophical conception on the one hand, or specific features of a type 
of governing system on the other, realistically utopian philosophy* describes the aim of 
political philosophy itself. Again, this aim is fairly consistent across Rawls‘s domestic 
and international discussions. Here, philosophy is realistically utopian* when it  
extends what are ordinarily thought of as the limits of practical political 
possibility. Our hope for the future rests on the belief that the possibilities of our 
social world allow a reasonably just constitutional democratic society living as a 
member of a reasonably just Society of Peoples. An essential step to being 
reconciled to our social world is to see that such a Society of Peoples is indeed 
possible (LP 124).
17
 
 
Although there is a fairly evident tie between extending the limits of practical political 
possibility and the first and second understandings of realistic utopia – since the first 
attempts to meld political moral ideals with the actual laws of our world, and the second 
gives content to the idea of our desired regime – the connection in the third conception to 
hope, belief, and reconciliation to our political future is an interesting and distinct 
element. It is this element that will, I will argue, cause realistically utopian philosophy* 
to yield a very different answer to the question of the appropriate relationship between 
realistic utopia and ideal theory.   
                                                 
17
 For a virtually identical quotation in the domestic context, see Justice as Fairness pp. 4. I have chosen to 
use the quotation in LP, although the international context is generally less useful to my own project, 
because the last line of this version explicitly highlights the connection between social reconciliation, our 
hope for the future, and our belief in the possibility of that future.  
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Realistic utopia is nonetheless problematic 
 However, although Rawls‘s conception of realistic utopia does not fall prey to 
many of the same arguments that can be made against more traditional u- and dystopias, 
it seems to me that the ambiguity of the term causes the conception itself to nonetheless 
remain problematic. The various potential uses of the term make a straightforward 
understanding of the relationship between realistic utopia and ideal theory virtually 
impossible. Instead, each use must be analyzed, and the relationship which springs from 
it compared to both the context and the spirit of Rawls‘s wider work. In the first two 
ways of cashing out the concept (in the first case, philosophy which meets the conditions 
for realistic utopia, and in the second, a realistic utopia itself), realistic utopia can remain 
squarely in the realm of ideal theory. The extent to which this is problematic only 
becomes clear in light of the term‘s third use (as philosophy which fulfills its realistically 
utopian role), which positions realistic utopia as a bridging device between ideal theory 
and the world in which we live.  
When Rawls uses ―realistic utopia‖ in the first sense, to describe the 
characteristics of a type of philosophy, the conditions for realisticness play an important 
role. He is indeed concerned with a philosophy that must be applicable to real world 
scenarios. However, as we should remember from the discussion of ideal theory in the 
first chapter, Rawlsian attention to a real world need not signify attention to our real 
world. Although ideal theory must take into consideration a realistic account of human 
nature, it does so in the context of a society effectively regulated by the circumstances 
most hospitable to justice‘s correct functioning. This is clearly not our own society. As 
long as realistically utopian philosophy can apply to the sorts of people who would live in 
a realistic utopia (in the second sense in which that term can be used), it matters very 
little whether or not it can apply to us.
18
 This use of realistic utopia, then, remains in the 
realm of ideal theory – it is purely a philosophers‘ concept. It is their job as thinkers to 
                                                 
18
 It will certainly matter whether we, or our children, can become the kinds of people who would live in a 
realistic utopia. Rawls holds that we can, but this, I will argue in the last chapter, is a claim which he makes 
far too quickly.  
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determine what sort of theory of justice could best govern a society of that sort. In this 
case we, as citizens, have no job.  
In the second case of realistic utopia, when this term is used to describe a 
reasonably just constitutional democracy, the concept is even more clearly one that 
belongs in ideal theory. This use of the term describes the content of a reasonably just 
constitutional democracy – and it should be very clear to us, when we look at the 
previously mentioned conditions for stability in such a democracy, that societies of this 
type do not currently exist. A realistic utopia is here a goal which we might reach, and 
says nothing to us about the real world as it now stands, or how we could get from here to 
there. Describing the content of a realistic utopia in this sense is again a philosophers‘ 
project which engages itself with wider society no more than the task of describing the 
character of realistically utopian philosophy did. 
Let me be clear: the first two senses of realistic utopia need not be illegitimate 
uses of the concept simply because they remain entirely in the realm of ideal theory. 
Political philosophers are of course philosophers; as philosophers they will legitimately 
need to engage in a good deal of theoretical work. Without political theorizing about the 
content of the society that we want, and the characteristics of the philosophy that 
describes that society, it will be very hard to meet any of the goals set by those roles. The 
problem arises when only ideal theory‘s uses of realistic utopia are employed. Recall the 
roles of political philosophy which we discussed at the beginning of this chapter. I argued 
that, if political philosophy is to fill any of those roles, it must have profound effects on 
the citizenry generally, and cannot remain exclusively in philosophical circles.  
Rawls is right to say that we need ideals to aim toward if our work for change is 
to be of any use. But we must have something more than ideals if political philosophy is 
to fill the roles which he set for it. Ideal theory and the goals it sets certainly have a part 
to play in fulfilling those roles, but without something which can bridge the gap between 
philosophers and the rest of the world, political philosophy will remain wholly 
unsuccessful in completing the task which it has been set. Realistically utopian 
philosophy* provides just such a bridging mechanism. By emphasizing the importance of 
hope for what could be, it also emphasizes the fact that we are not there yet. And by 
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replacing the emphasis on us, who are so far from where we should be, it returns us to 
those problems of such central importance: addressing politically divisive conflict, 
orienting us in terms of our fellow citizens, reconciling us to our political realities, and 
providing us hope for the political realities of the future.   
It is in this final sense that I will use the concept of realistic utopia for the 
remainder of my thesis. Having noted this, I will no longer use the * designation. Unless 
otherwise noted, references to realistic utopia will, from now on, refer to philosophy 
which fulfills its realistically utopian role.      
 
Realistic utopia, realizability, and realization 
 If we content ourselves with the first two uses of realistic utopia, we remain in 
ideal theory, and we are thrown back to the feasibility debate. By accepting the 
conditions of realisticness as Rawls does – by making the limitations of human beings of 
central importance, and by demanding that our recommendation be applicable to real 
scenarios – we have already taken a stand in that debate. If the limitations of human 
beings (the ―laws of nature‖) can constrain the requirements of justice and of a 
reasonably just constitutional democracy, then we have agreed that conditions of 
feasibility constrain what we can require of human beings. But as long as we remain in 
the realm of ideal theory, we fail to ask that further and more important question: the 
question of realization.  
 Determining the conditions of realizability is an acceptable stopping point for 
philosophers who take their task to be nothing more than providing an answer to the 
feasibility debate. But if we are working on Rawls‘s framework, and accepting the roles 
of political philosophy that he proposes, then we have already accepted that political 
philosophy must be about something more than answering theoretical debates. If we are 
to fill those roles of political philosophy, then we must worry as much about realization 
as we do about realizability. And this, in turn, will mean adding a third condition of 
realisticness to Rawls‘s realistically utopian philosophy: in addition to demanding that it 
is based on the laws of nature, and that it‘s principles be applicable to real human beings 
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and real human problems, it must also provide a solution toward which we in our own 
imperfect world can actually and successfully work. Thomas Pogge thinks that Rawls‘s 
realistic utopia already is ―an ideal social world that is reachable from the present on a 
plausible path of transition‖ (Pogge 2007: 27). I think that he is right to emphasize the 
importance of this dimension of a project like Rawls‘s, but I think that he is also wrong to 
think that this is a requirement of Rawls‘s project as it stands.  
Concentrating on ideal theory will not tell us if or how the social world which we 
desire is reachable from the social world which we have. And determining if and how we 
can reach a realistic utopia will be crucial for the third conception of realistically utopian 
philosophy: since the hope that it is meant to give us is so important, the reachability of a 
realistic utopia cannot be merely and tenuously theoretical. Given the distance between 
our own world and a realistic utopia, we cannot just assume that the latter as laid out in 
Rawls is reachable on a path of transition from our world. Instead, in order to provide us 
with the hope that realistically utopian philosophy is meant to give us, we should make 
this reachability a central condition for realistically utopian philosophy. This condition, in 
conjunction with the four roles of political philosophy, will then require us to engage in 
the nonideal theory that will allow us to answer the question in a way that justifies our 
hope. Rather than creating a theory which we have argued is realizable (as Rawls has 
done), we will then be involved in the actual work of realization (which both a condition 
like Pogge‘s and Rawls's roles of political philosophy should require us to do).  
    
Why Rawls is wrong to settle for realizability 
 Rawls himself at one point makes a clear statement that realization need not be a 
requirement of political philosophy: 
While realization is, of course, not unimportant, I believe that the very possibility 
of such a social order can itself reconcile us to the social world. The possibility is 
not mere logical possibility, but one that connects with the deep tendencies and 
inclinations of the social world. For so long as we believe for good reasons that a 
self-sustaining and reasonably just political social order both at home and abroad 
is possible, we can reasonably hope that we or others will someday, somewhere, 
achieve it; and we can then do something toward this achievement (LP, 128).  
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However, as I have said, if political philosophy‘s realistically utopian role is to reconcile 
us as citizens to our future as a society – rather than just to provide this reconciliation to 
the philosophers in our midst – then theoretical assurance of this sort will not be enough. 
There are at least two further questions that we must ask of Rawls, in order for 
realistically utopian philosophy to give us the hope that it should. They are: 1) Can these 
conditions actually obtain? And 2) Do we indeed have reason to hope that these 
conditions will actually obtain? 
The first of these questions may seem to be a strange one to ask, given that Rawls 
has already applied two conditions for realisticness to the concept of realistic utopia. One 
could simply point to the claim which Rawls makes: since realistically utopian 
philosophy must rely on ―the actual laws of nature‖ taking ―men as they are‖ as the 
citizens to be governed, only principles which can indeed govern human beings may 
acceptably be chosen as part of that philosophy. And if principles of justice which can 
govern real human beings can be formulated, then it must be possible for the parallel 
conditions which allow human beings to be governed by them to apply. We must 
remember, however, that the ―deep tendencies and inclinations of the social world‖ that 
support the possibility of realistic utopia used in the second sense (as a synonym for a 
reasonably just constitutional democracy) are those of a well-ordered society. But it is not 
citizens of a well-ordered society who must be reconciled to their political future – it is 
us, and we in our less-than-well-ordered society have tendencies and inclinations which 
are as far from ideal as the less-than-just basic institutions that inspire them. Perhaps the 
world of Rawls‘ ideal theory could obtain in the presence of the appropriate inclinations, 
and perhaps those inclinations themselves could conceivably be our own. For the 
moment, however, they are not, and to assume that they could be on the basis of the sorts 
of tendencies and inclinations that we would have in a well-ordered society would be to 
beg the question. Given the distance between a hypothetical well-ordered society and our 
own, we must first ask: can the deep tendencies and inclinations necessary for a well-
ordered society obtain? 
Ferriera shares this concern. Since we can only confidently say that Rawls's 
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conception of justice is possible in the context of ideal theory and a well-ordered society, 
he thinks that belief in its possibility will be of little use to us, in our real human world. 
He notes that 
If justice seemed obtainable from where we are now, that fact might reconcile us 
to current injustice in some way; but to say that it is obtainable in an idealized, 
hypothetical society only vaguely similar to our own, and which we have very 
little idea how to reach, seems as likely to leave us unreconciled to our actual 
condition as to say that it is impossible. If our belief that justice is possible is 
limited to ideal theory, the hope that it sustains may look rather forlorn (Ferriera 
2009: 100). 
 
I think that Ferriera is right that, as it stands, the only statements which we can make with 
any confidence about the possibility of justice as fairness, are those which are limited to 
its existence in the context of a well-ordered society. But here, once again, Ferriera's 
interest in feasibility and my interest in realization come apart. Since realization is my 
concern, it is also my concern to understand how we can make justice ―obtainable from 
where we are now‖. And if we can do this, then it seems that our hope for the possibility 
of meaningful justice in our own world may no longer be so forlorn.  
For this reason, I think that the second question which must be answered is to 
what extent it is reasonable to hope that, as Rawls stated in the quotation above, a ―just 
political social order both at home and abroad is possible‖ and that ―we or others will 
someday, somewhere, achieve it‖. Again, even if we grant that our own inclinations and 
tendencies (or the inclinations and tendencies of those in our future societies) can 
conceivably be shaped into those which would support and be supported by a well-order 
society, it does not seem immediately obvious that they are likely to be. Indeed, since we 
lack the just basic institutions that would form us appropriately, without a concerted and 
intentional effort toward such forming, it seems highly unlikely that our own inclinations 
and tendencies will accidentally come to fit the bill. Since Ferriera is concerned with the 
feasibility of Rawls's theory of justice as it now stands, it might seem that the answer to 
this question should also be a depressingly negative one. Yet if we consider hope in the 
context of realization rather than feasibility, I think that the answer will become different. 
Hope is an important concept in Rawls, and Ferriera is right to point to it. Yet I will argue 
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in the next chapter that it can only be valuable insofar as its connection to realization is 
kept firmly in mind.     
 If Rawls‘s theory cannot answer these questions, or if it gives us the wrong 
answers, then it will require serious revision. Remember that Rawls revised his theory of 
justice in light of the fact that a single shared comprehensive doctrine could not stably 
govern a pluralistic society in which the burdens of conscience were honored. He did this 
because his theory as it was previously stated was not realizable – it yielded an 
unacceptable answer to the question of political liberalism.
19
 In the case of realistic 
utopia, Rawls‘s theory will need to be altered because, as it stands, it cannot fulfill the 
realistically utopian role which he said that it must: that of providing a society with hope 
for and reconciliation to its future. Here, the problem is once again one of realizability – 
but in this case, proving that philosophy‘s realistically utopian role can be met will 
require engaging precisely with realization itself. Without attempts to realize the 
requirements of a realistic utopia, our assurance that they can be met will be based on 
nothing but abstract theorizing, and this surely cannot provide our wider society with the 
hope which we cannot do without.  
 In the next chapter, I will investigate what it would mean to provide satisfactory 
answers to these questions. However, if we are to take seriously the requirement of 
realization, determining the conditions for these satisfactory answers will not be enough. 
In the final chapter, I will suggest some ways in which political philosophers can engage 
themselves meaningfully in the work of realization. 
                                                 
19
 Recall that this question was: ―How is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of 
free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines?‖ (PL 4). 
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Chapter 3: Hoping for a Realistic Utopia 
 
 At the end of the last chapter, I argued that if Rawls‘s philosophy is to stand, it 
must be able to answer two questions about the possibility of the sorts of inclinations and 
tendencies that would be required to support a realistic utopia. In this chapter, I attempt to 
answer each of these questions. The answer to the second question leads us into a 
discussion of the value of hope. Ultimately I conclude that Rawls‘s philosophy cannot 
provide satisfactory answers to the two relevant questions, but suggest ways in which it 
can be altered in order to do so. 
 
Question 1: 
Can the deep tendencies and inclinations necessary for a well-ordered society obtain? 
 Although the outcome of this question will play a crucial role in determining 
whether or not Rawls‘s given theory of justice can stand on its own, it may simply not be 
a question to which we are able to provide an answer. After all, it is both a simple matter 
of empirical fact, and a question about the future. Since it is a matter of empirical fact, we 
would need to be able to induce from evidence the possibility of these tendencies and 
inclinations obtaining (either that these conditions have obtained somewhere in the past 
or do currently obtain) in order to answer with any certainty the question of whether or 
not they could obtain. But since it is also a question about the future, we cannot do this. It 
is precisely because these conditions do not obtain now and have not obtained in the past 
(so far as we know), that we need to ask about the possibility of their obtaining in the 
future. So, if we are to rely only on empirical evidence, then lacking that evidence as we 
do, we are left with little more than the meager comfort that it seems at least logically 
possible for our own tendencies and inclinations to be as they might in a well-ordered 
society. 
 Yet it seems to me that current empirical evidence of these tendencies and 
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inclinations is not the only way of getting at their future possibility. Certainly if they did 
obtain we would know for certain that their obtaining was possible. But the converse 
does not hold. Just because they have not and do not obtain does not mean that they 
cannot. Whether or not our shared social history has been a history of progress in any 
meaningfully value-laden sense, it has surely been a history of immense and far-reaching 
social change. The variety of inclinations and tendencies to which we can presently point 
is as wide as the corresponding variety of political and social communities across the 
globe which have inspired them. What we as societies take the good to be, how we think 
that it is acceptable to treat human beings, and what we take the responsibilities of 
individuals to be, are issues about which staggeringly different claims are made in 
various parts of the world. Even if there is, as philosophers like Kwame Anthony Appiah 
or Martha Nussbaum might argue, much that unites us when it comes to shared values, 
there is also much – especially at the level of tendencies and inclinations – which is 
importantly different. This seems to me to be a more than plausible reason to think that 
the inclinations of human beings are neither innate nor fixed.  
 Further, if we look into history, we can see a similarly broad variety of ways of 
being over the course of time within single societies. Even in its short history, the United 
States has proved to be an ideal example of this trend toward change and reinvention. The 
1776 claim in the Declaration of Independence that ―All men are created equal‖ was, at 
the time, viciously inaccurate. It was a nation of white, male, land-owner citizens. The 
Suffrage and Civil Rights movements have been examples of the way in which the 
changing tendencies and inclinations of the nation‘s population have been expressed in 
social action and later in policy. Neither is this conversation a finished one. Healthy 
debate still rages in the US on many social issues, including what status we ought to grant 
to homosexual relationships, and whether or not citizenship should be a requirement for 
many of the rights and privileges which we take to be so indispensable for Americans. 
Taking America as only one example among many, it seems clear not only that human 
communities can have a broad range of tendencies and inclinations, but also that these 
same features of a single community can experience profound revisions and reversals. 
From the viewpoint of the past, I suspect that we could have anticipated with no 
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confidence – if we could have anticipated at all! – the sort of social community that we 
have today. So although the tendencies and inclinations in question do not obtain now, it 
does not seem impossible that they might. 
 Although Rawls expresses great confidence in our ability to embody these 
tendencies and inclinations, he nevertheless seems to recognize that we cannot accurately 
anticipate what is to come in our human future. He knows that ―there is a question about 
how the limits of the practicable are discerned and what the conditions of our social 
world in fact are‖ and he acknowledges that ―the limits of the possible are not given by 
the actual‖ (JF 5). I think that we can take these admissions to be either damning or 
heartening. On the one hand, accepting them means that we cannot know with any 
certainty that we shall ever be any better than we are. On the other hand, however, we 
need not think that our condition is either fixed or inescapable. If the limits of the 
possible are not given by the actual, then we have the potential to be and do things that 
we have as of yet not even imagined.  
 So what should we say about the possibility of the specific tendencies and 
inclinations which would be required for a well-ordered society? I think that we have no 
choice but to leave it an open question. We cannot in an epistemically responsible way 
say that our desired conditions can indeed obtain in human societies, but as the sorts of 
creatures that we are, I do not think that we can afford to deny the possibility either. 
Since we do not know, we have two choices: we can either believe that our conditions 
can obtain, or believe that they cannot. In both cases, we could be either right or wrong. 
But if we refuse to believe that the conditions can obtain, it seems safe to say that they 
will not. After all, we are creatures who experience some important level of control over 
what we can do and be. Just as I am highly unlikely to act in generous ways if I believe 
that I am incapable of generosity, it is highly unlikely that we will ever have the 
appropriate tendencies and inclinations if we truly believe that we are incapable of 
possessing them. If we do believe, however, that we can be the sorts of people who 
would be formed by life in a well-ordered society, then our openness to this possibility 
leaves room for us to be those people in the event that our belief is correct. So while, in 
order to be epistemically responsible, it seems that we must leave the question open, I 
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think that, pragmatically, we have little choice but to act as if the answer to our original 
question is an affirmative one. Can the tendencies and inclinations necessary for a well-
ordered society obtain? If we care at all about whether or not we do embody them, then I 
think that we must at least allow the (admittedly unsubstantiated) belief that we can.  
 
Question 2: 
Do we have reason to hope that the tendencies and inclinations necessary for a well-
ordered society will ever obtain? 
 In answering the previous question, we just had to bite the bullet. We cannot 
know whether it is possible for those conditions to obtain, but insofar as this is a question 
about the way that we live our lives, and insofar as that question is an important one for 
us, we cannot simply put it out of our minds. If the appropriate inclinations and 
tendencies are not possible, then it is firstly the case that we cannot know, and secondly 
the case that there is nothing that we can do about the matter. If, on the other hand, they 
are possible, then we are in luck! But this luck is not something about which we can 
rejoice, for once again, on the basis of the evidence that we have before us, we cannot 
now know that they are in fact possible. 
 We should remember, however, our reason for asking these questions in the first 
place. Rawls held that facilitating reconciliation to our political future was one of our 
central reasons for doing political philosophy. In other words, it is important that we 
allow people to reasonably hope for a future society which is well-ordered and 
reasonably just. But why is such hoping valuable? What good does it do? The answers to 
these questions should, I think, inform the way in which we go about answering the 
question of whether or not we ought to have hope for our own inclinations and 
tendencies. 
 Although he makes reconciliation to both our political present and past a central 
role of political philosophy, Rawls himself nevertheless fails to give a substantive 
treatment of the importantly related notion of hope. In the previous section, I tried to 
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establish that we must believe in the possibility of realistic utopia, and Rawls as well 
thinks that establishing this point is vitally important. But establishing the possibility of 
realistic utopia does not by itself explain the link between that concept and hope. We still 
do not know exactly what hope is meant to do, or why it is valuable. If we turn to Rawls 
for an answer to these questions, I think that his clearest statement on the subject is to be 
found on the final page of The Law of Peoples. Here he says that the belief in the 
possibility of a realistic utopia ―affects our attitudes toward the world as a whole… 
affects us before we come to actual politics, and limits or inspires how we take part in it‖ 
(LP 128) and that the hope that we or others may someday, somewhere achieve it should 
serve to ―banish the dangers of resignation and cynicism‖ (Ibid.). It seems, then, that the 
belief in the possibility of a realistic utopia allows us the hope that it will come about. If 
we do not have hope that such a society is possible, then cynicism and despair will weigh 
us down and rob us of the will to ever treat political systems as a viable route for 
achieving meaningful change toward a more just society.  However, in the final lines of 
this book, Rawls once more emphasizes possibility over hope: if realistic utopia is not 
possible, and ―human beings are largely amoral, if not incurably cynical and self-
centered, one might ask, with Kant, whether it is worthwhile for human beings to live on 
the earth‖ (Ibid.). But is it really only the lack of possibility of realistic utopia which 
makes life potentially not worth living? Is it logical possibility? Or likely possibility? Is 
the possibility alone enough to give us hope? What then does hope add? What, in the end, 
is the value of hoping? 
 Since Rawls‘s discussion leaves unanswered so many questions about both the 
nature and value of hope, I turn now instead to the philosophical literature on the subject. 
I concentrate primarily on Luc Bovens‘s account of hope both because it seems to be the 
one most referenced in the literature, and because it offers the most complete account that 
I have found of the values of hoping. But before we can ask why hoping might be 
valuable, I think that we must first consider the possibility that it simply is not. Maybe 
Rawls has got it wrong, and hope is actually valueless after all. As Bovens points out, the 
skeptic about hope can not unreasonably claim that, whatever the facts of our situation 
are, we are always better off if we do not hope. The skeptic‘s argument would run in the 
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following way: I desire something in the future which either will or will not come about. 
For instance, I desire that the day will become warm. If I hope for it and it does not come 
about, then I will be more disappointed than I would have been if I had refrained from 
hoping and remained more neutrally indifferent about the possibility of a change in 
temperature. If I hope for it and it does come about then I will be no better off, for when 
we hope we ―tend to fill in the contours in the brightest colors‖ (Bovens, 670). Reality, 
even if it provides me with the outcome that I desired, will fail to map exactly onto the 
details of my hopes. If I had not hoped for the event, I might have been thrilled by it, but 
since I did I will now instead be frustrated by the minor ways in which reality does not 
correspond to my prior hopes. Perhaps I hoped for a warmer day, but am now frustrated 
that it is cloudy or that it has become too warm even for my tastes. Either way, the 
skeptic claims, ―I would have been better off not having hoped for anything and so it is 
always irrational to hope for something‖ (Ibid.). Hoping, on this story, invariably leads to 
frustration and disappointment. 
 I think that the skeptic might be right, if we only hoped about things like the 
temperature, which were entirely beyond our control. After all, this is still hope in some 
sense. We can hope for things beyond our control in a way which meets the requirements 
for what Philip Pettit calls ―superficial hope‖: this kind of hope consists of nothing more 
than a belief and a desire (Pettit 2004: 153). In order to hope, we must first believe that 
there is a possibility that a state of affairs will come about without believing that it is 
certain to do so. If an event is certain to occur, then we expect it rather than hope for it, 
and if it is impossible for that event to occur, we may wish for it, but cannot say that we 
hope for it. Secondly, hope requires that we desire the outcome which we consider 
possible. If we did not desire it, our orientation toward that outcome could just as easily 
be one of dread or indifference.  
Interestingly, with the emphasis that Rawls places on possibility, this superficial 
hope seems to be all that Rawls requires to banish the dangers of resignation and 
cynicism. After all, he believes that realization of a just social order is irrelevant to the 
value of realistically utopian philosophy. He says that ―the very possibility of such a 
(just) social order can itself reconcile us to the social world‖ (LP 128). In this case, then, 
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it seems that all that he needs should be precisely a belief and a desire. If realization does 
not matter, then he should be content with the kind of superficial hope that we would 
have for something like a change in weather – realization of justice, for him, seems to be 
as out of our hands as a sunny day.  
 Yet if this kind of hope is enough for Rawls, then I think that the skeptic might 
indeed be right. If frustration and disappointment are significantly harmful, which Rawls 
says elsewhere that they are,
20
 then it might be better if realistically utopian philosophy 
did not cause us to hope for a more just future society. It might be better if we simply 
waited to see if the possibility came about. In that case, we should continue to assert that 
the correct tendencies and inclinations are possible, but remain entirely indifferent on the 
question of whether or not they will obtain.  
 But then, if the skeptic is right, was Rawls simply wrong to consistently mention 
hope in tandem with the possibility of realistic utopia? Would he have done better merely 
to argue for the possibility and leave it at that? Or would we do better to understand hope 
in a different way, so that hope can indeed add something to mere possibility?  
Most of the philosophers writing on the subject do require more of hope than the 
appropriate beliefs and desires. In addition to belief and desire, each of the following 
philosophers requires a third constitutive condition of hope. Philip Pettit (2004) thinks 
that substantial (as opposed to superficial) hope requires a ―cognitive resolve‖ to act as if 
your hopes were going to be fulfilled, while Darrel Moellendorf (2006) makes motivation 
to act in the service of the hoped-for events constitutive of meaningful hoping. Victoria 
McGeer (2004) holds that hope is ―an essential and distinctive feature of human agency‖ 
(McGeer 2004: 100), and so connects it intimately with choices that we make and actions 
that we undertake. It seems to me that all three of these philosophers require their 
respective third conditions because they recognize that hope, when it plays its most 
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 For Rawls, self-respect is a crucial primary good, and requires a confidence in one‘s ability to fulfill 
one‘s intentions (TJ 386). If we are consistently unable to realize our projects, experiencing failure and 
self-doubt, we will become unable to continue with our endeavors. We will then become disinvested in our 
projects and fail to place proper weight on the values which they express. Since persons are defined by their 
two moral powers – one of which is the capacity for a sense of the good – a lack of proper investment in 
our values will be a serious problem for Rawls. However, it seems to me that this sort of lack of investment 
can come just as easily from a perceived lack of one‘s own agency as from repetitive experiences of one‘s 
own failure. 
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important roles in our lives, is not about things like the weather. Instead, our most 
important hopes are about the things which, as McGeer says, are tied to our human 
agency. Our hopes are for outcomes over which we can have some control, and hope is 
valuable precisely because it gives us the confidence which spurs us into the action 
needed to bring those outcomes about. 
In the case of our first question (can the deep inclinations and tendencies 
necessary for a well-ordered society obtain?), I noted that the answer was a simple matter 
of empirical fact. If the answer was no, then we could not know that this was the case, 
and there was nothing that we could do about the matter. If, on the other hand, the answer 
is yes, then it remains the case that we cannot know that it is possible for them to obtain – 
but it is no longer the case that there is nothing that we can do. If it is possible for these 
conditions to obtain, then the second question (do we have reason to hope that they will 
obtain?) follows from the first. Here, a hope which spurs us into facilitating action will 
certainly be useful. In the absence of empirical evidence either that the correct tendencies 
and inclinations can obtain or that they cannot, hope suddenly becomes very important. 
Without hope, and the action it would inspire us to undertake, it is almost certain that 
these conditions will not obtain, for even if they are possible, they are not likely to come 
about on their own. With hope, however, we have at least a fighting chance, for our hope 
will inspire us to create an environment hospitable to the tendencies and inclinations that 
we desire.  
 If all this is correct, then it seems that Rawls is right to make realistically utopian 
philosophy, and the hope for the future which it inspires, such a central and crucial role of 
political philosophy. Yet, as I noted above, Rawls also seems content with realistically 
utopian philosophy which inspires only a superficial hope based on mere possibility, and 
which does not concern itself with the ultimate realization of our political ideals. As we 
should recall from the first chapter, the particulars of realization are the responsibility of 
nonideal theory as transition which concerns itself with the ways in which we might 
move from the world we have now to the world that we want. Since Rawls does not 
concern himself with this kind of nonideal theory, and instead remains almost entirely in 
the realm of ideal theory, the realistic utopia about which he speaks is a thing which we 
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might hope for as we would hope for a sunny day – both outcomes are entirely beyond 
our control. But instead of siding with the skeptic and claiming that it is better for us not 
to hope, I think that we should continue to investigate the ways in which hope can be 
valuable, and see if Rawls's account and this sort of hope can then be made consistent.   
 To determine, then, whether hope should indeed be important to Rawls‘s work, 
we will first need a clearer understanding of why hope is valuable. In addition to asking 
why hope is valuable generally, however, we must ask several other questions of hoping 
on Rawls‘s account: Can we understand Rawls to be talking about a hope which has the 
values of substantive hope? Or is he, as we feared, talking about a hope which is only 
superficial? Even if it is a superficial hope, can it nevertheless confer some of the values 
of a more substantive conception? And if it could not confer these values, would his work 
be compatible with a more substantial account which would bolster his project after all? 
Ultimately, how can we understand hope to do the work that Rawls needs it to do? 
 As I said, I will undertake the discussion of the value of hope primarily in light of 
Bovens's account. Bovens takes hope to have at least three kinds of instrumental value in 
addition to its intrinsic value. I shall begin here with the instrumental features of his 
account.  
 
Our hopes have a causal relationship with the world 
First, along with Pettit, Moellendorf, and McGeer, Bovens holds that there is a 
causal dependency between hoping for something and bringing it about. He offers the 
example of hoping for his daughter‘s help with a project. Although the skeptic would 
claim that he was better off not hoping for her help whether or not she ultimately decided 
to lend him a hand, Bovens points out that his hope will encourage him to act in ways 
which might influence her decision. His hope that she will work with him motivates him 
to ask her to do so – and a request from a loved one is often quite effective in motivating 
us to action. Even if we do not depend upon the goodwill of a loved one, however, our 
hopes can affect the way that we interact with the world. If I genuinely hope that I will be 
able to complete a marathon, then I will train for it more vigorously and enthusiastically 
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than I would if I felt either dejected about or attached no importance to my prospects of 
finishing. In Bovens‘s words, the skeptic is wrong about hope in this and so many other 
cases because ―the states of the world (viz., whether I will or will not bring the task to a 
successful end) are causally dependent on my choice (viz., whether to hope or not to 
hope)‖ (Bovens 1999: 671). Here, hope is valuable because it increases our chances of 
having our hopes realized.  
It seems to me, however, that hope as it stands in Rawls‘s project is not valuable 
in this way. In the project that Rawls undertakes (although not in the purposes which he 
assigns to political philosophy), his task is to formalize the conditions for a realistic 
utopia. He does not attempt, nor does he actively encourage other philosophers to 
attempt, the project of nonideal theory as transition. If we were to do this – if we were to 
propose ways in which we as philosophers could design avenues for change, and we as 
citizens could implement them – we would indeed have a situation in which the state of 
the world were (at least partly) causally dependent upon the actions which our hope 
inspired. This, however, would require us to move beyond questions of realizability into 
the work of realization. There can be no causal dependence between a state of the world 
and a proposal which is feasible but unapplied. Insofar, then, as we took a more just 
world to be valuable, our hope would also be valuable on the basis of its role in realizing 
that more just world. But since Rawls does not either do or encourage this, hope as it 
stands in his project only makes us vulnerable to the disappointment and disheartenment 
that the skeptic promises.  
 
Hope aids us in more than fair gambles 
Hope‘s second instrumental value, for Bovens, lies in its ability to help us to 
counteract risk aversion in the case of more than fair gambles.
21
 He tells us that ―the 
players who adopt a resolution to accept life‘s more than fair gambles tend to come out as 
winners, while the players who resist such a resolution tend to come out as losers‖ 
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 A fair gamble is a gamble in which there is a 50-50 chance of success. In a more than fair gamble, 
chances of success are higher, and in a less than fair gamble, they are lower. 
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(Bovens 1999: 672). They come out as losers, of course, because of the clichéd but 
importantly true fact that, in order to win, you need to play. This is by no means to say 
that hope would be valuable if it encouraged us to engage in just any gamble – while it is 
true to say that you cannot win the lottery unless you play, a ―hopeful‖ strategy in this 
sort of case leads many to spend money with which they cannot afford to part on an 
infinitesimally small chance at a great return. Yet when we are presented with the 
opportunity for more than fair gambles, hope plays a crucial role in ensuring a good 
outcome. More than fair gambles remain gambles, so there of course remains the 
possibility of losing out, especially in the short term. But if one engages in more than fair 
gambles the odds are significantly in favor of one‘s coming out on top. If one engages in 
these gambles consistently, the long-term odds are even better. Hope then, helps us to 
counteract this risk aversion so that we enter the game in the first place. Of course, one 
might object that, given a more than fair gamble, a computer would also play the odds. 
Clearly hope plays no role here. This seems right to me, but it also seems right to say that 
a computer would not ―play it safe‖, refusing to gamble at all on the basis of the very real 
possibility of losing out even in a more than fair gamble. Human beings certainly do play 
it safe in this way, refusing to take even quite good odds. It is here that hope plays its 
important role of counteracting risk aversion. 
I think, however, that the sort of hope that Rawls talks about once again fails to be 
valuable in this way. As we noted, hope is only valuable when it helps us to counteract 
risk aversion in more than fair gambles. When our gambles are less than fair, as they are 
in the case of the lottery, acting on the basis of our hope can lead to ruinous 
consequences. Here, Bovens recognizes that fear which helps us to focus on our potential 
(and likely) losses in less than fair gambles is just as valuable to us as hope in more than 
fair gambles can be (Ibid.). There may be intrinsic value to the pleasure of hoping,
22
 but 
hoping in the absence of at least some good reason seems to render such hope 
importantly valueless. Not only are the consequences of such foolish hope likely to be far 
too painful to be counteracted by the anticipatory pleasure of that hope, but hoping 
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against odds which one knows to be less than fair may involve self deception which has a 
negative value in its own right.  
In Rawls‘s case, I am unconvinced by the idea that our gamble is more than fair. 
What we have is an unsubstantiated claim that it is possible for the object of our hopes – 
the tendencies and inclinations that support a well-ordered society – to obtain. Remember 
that these tendencies and inclinations, in Rawls‘s picture, are themselves the product of a 
well-ordered society. We have no well-ordered societies now, nor have we had them in 
the past. Why ought we to think that they will spring fully formed out of the air and 
provide us with citizens whose inclinations and tendencies are as we want them to be? 
Indeed, if one were to play devil‘s advocate, one might even argue that tragedies like the 
Holocaust and the genocides in Darfur and Rwanda give us serious reason to think that 
the tendencies and inclinations that we want will and can not obtain. 
I realize that I have said two things here which may appear to be contradictory. 
Just now I have said that I am unconvinced that our gamble on a well-ordered society is 
more than fair, and also that we ought not be recommended by hope to act on less than 
fair gambles. Earlier, I said that I think that, despite the fact that we cannot know if our 
desired conditions can obtain (in other words, although we do not know if the gamble is 
more than fair), we ought to act on the basis of the hope that they can. I think, however, 
that despite appearances, these statements are compatible. Indeed, I do not know if 
Rawls‘s project alone offers us a more or less than fair gamble. I do think, however, that 
if we hope in the sense that we did when we claimed that our hopes had a causal effect on 
the world, then we tip the scales in our favor – we create a more than fair gamble. Of 
course, how much more than fair that gamble is, is debatable. But the harder that we 
work at stacking the odds in our favor – the harder we try to create situations which we 
encourage deep tendencies and inclinations like the ones that we want – the more that 
gamble moves from ―fair‖ toward ―certain‖. 
Rawls‘s problem, then, remains the same, and this is only one more consequence 
of it. He makes a merely theoretical claim about the possibility of a well-ordered society, 
which he cannot back up with any empirical evidence. Such an uncertain claim can do 
nothing to increase the odds in our gamble. Attention to the real inclinations and 
 63 
tendencies which people have, on the other hand, and to how these can be changed for the 
better, is more likely than anything else to increase these odds. Once more, though, 
simply discussing the realizability of these tendencies and inclinations will do nothing to 
bring them about. Active work in realization must be undertaken if providing ourselves 
with a more than fair gamble is our goal. So it is once again insofar as hoping encourages 
us to act in these ways, and not insofar as it is changes our beliefs about possibilities in 
the world, that it is valuable.  
 
Hope engenders new constitutive hopes 
Finally, Bovens holds that hope is instrumentally valuable in that it causes us to 
analyze our hopes, and so our values and goals and the kinds of people that we take 
ourselves to be (Bovens 1999: 673).
23
 When we invest ourselves in active, engaged hope 
for a particular outcome, the attention and reflection which we give to our hopes extends 
to ourselves. In hoping for a promotion, I imagine as well my reactions and pleasures 
upon receiving it. From this I may realize that I had hoped for the promotion for the 
wrong reasons, and ought to pursue either more ethical or more pragmatic ways of 
reaching my goals. Alternatively, I may realize that this promotion is more important to 
me than I had ever imagined, and hope further to continue on my path in more explicit 
ways than I could have before conceived. Or perhaps in analyzing my hopes, I realize 
that I have been selfish in my attempts to attain them, and hope to become the sort of 
person who does not routinely place her own good ahead of that of others. Hope in this 
story is valuable because it brings us knowledge of ourselves and our values which 
previously eluded us.  
Although this characteristic of hope may be extremely valuable in everyday 
scenarios, it seems to be no more valuable in the context of Rawls‘s project than were the 
others. In our day to day lives, we are prone to hoping without thinking deeply, and so it 
seems right that the energy that we spend on visualizing our triumphs and our reactions to 
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 Bovens takes this aspect of hope to be both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable. I do not address 
these two forms of value separately because Rawls‘s work fails to benefit in the same ways in regards to 
each. 
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them would be well-spent. In a theory like Rawls‘s, however, goals, principles, and 
values have been analyzed extensively. Justice as fairness has undergone an impressive 
evolution from its first appearance in A Theory of Justice, to its central reworking in 
Political Liberalism, through its international extension in The Law of Peoples, and 
finally to its last expression in Justice as Fairness. Each change has been the result of 
detailed and critical thought about each of the components involved in the theory, and 
about the implications and values of each of its parts. It seems highly unlikely, given the 
deep philosophical thought involved in Rawls‘s work, that simple hoping will clarify his 
theories or their goals much further. Indeed, this is one of the greatest strengths of 
Rawls‘s work – although he may not tell us how we can acceptably get to where we want 
to be, the clarity of his goals is impeccable.  
Although we as political philosophers may have no need of hope in this capacity, 
one could say that hope is still valuable in this role insofar as political philosophers 
attempt to engender in the public the hope for a future well-ordered society. I think that 
this claim is importantly right – but it cannot be a suggestion in support of Rawls‘s 
theory. In the second chapter of this thesis I argued that, although all four of Rawls‘s 
roles of political philosophy demanded extension into the broader community, his work 
did nothing to facilitate that extension. I think that hope of this type may then be a crucial 
aspect of political philosophy, but I do not think that Rawls‘s philosophy provides it. 
Once again, if this role is going to be filled, political philosophy will need to turn its 
attention to realization in the form of intellectual engagement with the community on the 
question of and the need for justice.  
 
The pleasures of hoping 
 In addition to the instrumental values of hope, Bovens also takes hope to be 
valuable in its own right on the basis of the pleasures that accompany hoping. Not only 
do we delight in the anticipation of a desired outcome, but we also benefit from the fact 
that ―in times of hardship, there is welcome respite in hoping‖ (Bovens 1999: 676). One 
of the most obvious examples of the value of hope is that of the Jewish prisoners in 
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World War II‘s Nazi concentration camps. Hope is a common theme in biographical 
accounts of the time, and in many of them, life is made possible just insofar as hope 
remains. When hope begins to wane, life itself becomes literally impossible.  
 This may be the central reason for which Rawls takes hope to be so indispensable. 
Remember how important reconciliation was for Rawls: he cared deeply that our belief in 
the possibility of a realistic utopia prevent us from becoming bitter toward our world, or 
painfully resigned to it. Hope was the mechanism by which we could avoid these 
debilitating emotions and Rawls felt that realizability was enough to give it to us; for him, 
merely ―seeing that the conditions of a social world at least allow for [the possibility of a 
well-ordered society] affects our view of the world itself and our attitude toward it‖ (JF 
38). What hope must most importantly do is allow us to see the world as no longer 
―hopelessly hostile, a world in which the will to dominate and oppressive cruelties, 
abetted by prejudice and folly, must inevitably prevail‖ (Ibid.). For this, he thinks that the 
practical possibility of such a world alone will suffice. I agree with him wholeheartedly 
that such despair is deadly poison for the sorts of creatures that we human beings are – 
but I do not think that practical possibility alone can be enough to give us the hope which 
can sustain us.  
Paulo Freire tells us that it is precisely from high hope that we fall to our deepest 
lows. For him, ―hopelessness is but hope that has lost its bearings‖ (Freire 1992: 8), and 
―hopelessness and despair are both the consequence and the cause of inaction or 
immobilism‖ (Freire 1992: 9). We must be careful not to hope in an empty way, or we 
may ―experience it in a mistaken form, and thereby allow it to slip toward hopelessness 
and despair‖ (Ibid.). Here, the most tragic despair is a consequence of realizing that one 
has hoped for something which one cannot, or has done nothing to, bring about. For 
Freire, it is impossible to successfully do what Rawls attempts to do: to tie the crucial 
human need for hope to a future which is not causally dependent upon our actions.  
Hope, as an ontological need, demands an anchoring in practice. As an 
ontological need, hope needs practice in order to become historical concreteness. 
That is why there is no hope in sheer hopefulness. The hoped-for is not attained 
by dint of raw hoping. Just to hope is to hope in vain (Ibid.). 
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Rawls may be right to emphasize the importance of hope for protecting us from tragic 
despair, but if Freire is right, an empty hope is the last thing which may give us this 
protection. Instead, such hope robs us not only of our optimism, but of our agency as 
well. And without a sense of our own agency, we would be very different sorts of beings 
from the human beings which we are now. I think that Freire is right to identify such a 
strong link between successful hope and our sense of agency. Although the pleasures of 
groundless hoping may initially be valuable, the cost is simply too great – we cannot 
afford the paralyzing despair that comes on the heels of empty hoping. 
 McGeer holds that hoping is a condition for the very possibility of living a human 
life, and for this reason she distinguishes not between hope and the failure to hope, but 
between hoping well and hoping badly (McGeer 2004: 102). Divorced from human 
agency as it is, the sort of empty hope that suffices for Rawls‘s purposes would count for 
McGeer as an instance of the latter kind. She notes as valuable the psychological 
definition of hope as ―a cognitive activity that involves setting concrete goals, finding 
pathways to achieve those goals, and tapping one‘s willpower or agency to move along 
pathways to the specified goals‖ (McGeer2004: 103). Rawls‘s philosophy meets only the 
first of these conditions, so I take the hope that it inspires to fall into the category of what 
McGeer calls ―wishful hoping‖: 
Wishful hopers thus generate hopes that are fanciful insofar as they are not 
grounded in any real understanding of how they will be realized; they are simply 
the direct output of desires and so undisciplined by knowledge of the world. 
Moreover, because wishful hopers have a dependence on external powers for 
bringing their hopes about, this generates a kind of passivity with respect to 
invoking their own powers of agency for realizing their hoped-for ends: wishful 
hopers await their future goods; they do not constructively work toward them… 
Thus, wishful hopers are highly vulnerable to despair. Because their hopes are 
unrealistic,
24
 they are quite unlikely to be realized (McGeer 2004: 113). 
 
For McGeer then, as well as for Freire, the wrong sort of hope is worse than no hope at 
all, because it sets us up for invariable despair when we realize that our own failure to 
exercise our agency has set the object of our hopes beyond our reach. Once again, the 
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 Wishful hopers are unrealistic in hoping not because their ends themselves are unrealistic, but because 
they are unrealistic about the way in which hopes are achieved – that is, they fail to realize that our hopes 
are achieved through our working to bring them about. 
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intrinsic value of pleasure in hoping does not seem to be enough to justify its high price.  
  
The shortcomings of Bovens’s account of hope 
I think that McGeer is right to say that we ask the wrong question when we ask 
whether or not we should hope. We are creatures importantly oriented toward the future, 
and we have a deeply vested interest in what that future happens to be like. McGeer is 
right that insofar as we are meaningfully human, we cannot help but hope. But if hope 
opens us up to the tragic despair about which she and Freire speak, then we must indeed 
ask what it means to hope well. The problem with Rawls‘s philosophy is not that he 
addresses hope when he should not – it is that his model only provides us with tools for 
hoping badly. 
 Throughout this discussion of hope, I have focused on Bovens‘s account for the 
reasons that I mentioned above: it is the account most referenced in the literature, and it 
provides an extremely clear and detailed inventory of the values of hope. Nevertheless, I 
think that it has a serious flaw. Like Pettit, Moellendorf, and McGeer, Bovens thinks that 
a third constitutive condition is required in order to turn a superficial account of hope into 
a substantial one. His condition, however, is very different from any of theirs. For Pettit, 
Moellendorf, and McGeer, the third condition for hope is linked closely with our agency. 
For Bovens, this third condition seems to me to be more like a willingness to engage in 
daydreaming. For him, in addition to an uncertain belief in the possibility of an outcome 
and a desire for that outcome, one who hopes must also engage in ―mental imaging‖: a 
―devotion of mental energy to what it would be like if some projected state of the world 
were to materialize‖ (Bovens 1999: 674). In other words, one cannot simply believe that 
a state of affairs is possible and consciously or unconsciously desire it. In order to hope, 
one must have invested time and thought into yearning for that outcome.  
 This condition, however, seems to me to be insufficient for valuable hope, for it 
fails to clarify the difference between substantial hoping and wishful hoping. Wishful 
hoping is much like wishful thinking. In the latter, ―one's desire that p renders one biased 
in favor of evidence for p‖ (McLaughlin 1988: 42). Further, in wishful thinking one 
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adopts a desired belief even when the evidence is insufficient: wishing means that ―one 
'jumped' beyond the evidence to the conclusion that p, prompted by one's desire that p, 
and the desire that p bolstered the belief despite the absence of adequate evidence‖ (Ibid., 
italics are my own). In wishful hoping, one does not necessarily adopt the belief that the 
desired state of affairs will come about, but one does fervently hope far beyond the 
evidence, while failing to do anything to make that hope realized. And this seems to me 
to be practically irrational in the same way. Bovens's mental imaging condition, by 
engaging us intimately with our desires, feeds our willingness to believe that our hopes 
will be realized, but does nothing whatsoever to ensure that they will be. It opens us up to 
dangers of wishful hoping, without furthering our desired project in any meaningful way. 
 It seems to me that substantial hope, on the other hand, is not practically irrational 
in the same way, although it also fails to take the evidence before it exactly at face value.  
This relationship to evidence, however, can be made sense of if we take substantial 
hoping to parallel positive thinking, which is itself a species of motivated belief. Positive 
thinking is ―thinking in which, for one or another reason, the thinker holds that the 
desired outcome is made more likely if he believes in it‖ (Johnston 1988: 74). In this 
case, the positive thinker recognizes the actual likelihood of her desired outcome, but 
chooses nevertheless to believe something subtly different because she holds that this 
outcome will in fact be made more likely by her belief. The classic example here is 
William James's, in which a person who comes to a gorge adopts the motivated belief 
that she can jump across it (James 1895). This belief quells her anxiety and so puts her in 
a more competent place to undertake a successful jump. The person who hopes in a 
substantial way does not  similarly adopt the belief that her hope will be realized, but the 
relationship between her hope and the evidence is parallel to that of the relationship 
between the positive thinker's belief and its own evidence. Both the substantial hoper and 
the positive thinker move beyond the available evidence not simply because they want 
the desired state of affairs, but because they take it to be the case that adopting their 
respective positions actually makes it more likely that their desired states of affairs will 
come about. In this case, then, unlike the last, hoping is indeed practically rational.       
 Bovens's third condition for hope is not useful because mental imaging seems to 
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me to be sufficient only for the sort of hope that parallels wishful thinking. Yet only hope 
that parallels positive thinking allows us to act, practically rationally, on the basis of 
something which does not exactly correlate to the evidence which we have before us. 
What we need in order both to differentiate between substantial hoping and wishful 
hoping, and to preserve what is valuable about the former, is a condition more like 
Pettit‘s, Moellendorf‘s, or McGeer‘s. This sort of condition ties hope to our agency and 
our effective motivation to act in the service of the hoped-for outcome. Indeed, I think 
that even on Bovens‘s own account, this further condition is required. None of the 
benefits which Bovens takes hope to have remain if our hopes are unconnected to our 
actions. There can be no causal dependency between hoping and bringing about a state of 
affairs if hope is not tied concretely to action. Similarly, hope will not aid us in 
counteracting risk aversion if it does not effectively motivate us to take the more than fair 
gamble before us. Neither will the pleasures of hope remain sweet if our hopes are 
consistently unmet, and for them to be met, more often than not we will need to engage 
actively in bringing them about. It may be the case that hope can still be valuable in 
bringing about self-knowledge, but it is not clear that wishing cannot do this equally. 
 What makes hope distinctive and valuable, then, requires a condition connected to 
agency even on Bovens‘s own account. He merely fails to provide it. And without this 
sort of third condition, it is correct that we cannot make a useful link between hope and 
the possibility of justice in a world quite far from our own. It is precisely because Ferriera 
relies on Bovens's conception of hope, and does not demand a conception of hope 
meaningfully tied to agency, that he is correct in his estimation that our hope will be so 
forlorn. To give ourselves a more robust conception of hope, we must tie our hope to a 
condition which demands an orientation toward realization. I prefer Moellendorf‘s 
formulation of such a condition, which he refers to as the ―practical aspect of hope‖. It 
states that ―the taking of one‘s beliefs and desires as reasons for action is a necessary 
condition of hoping‖ (Moellendorf 2006: 420). It recognizes that as long as we fail to be 
motivated by our hopes, we cannot properly be said to be hoping at all. As long as we 
base our hope on the feasibility of our desired outcome, and fail to be motivated to 
attempt that outcome's realization, our hope will be a forlorn exercise indeed. So long as 
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hope is tied to agency, however, hoping seems to be anything but forlorn. Instead, in this 
case it seems to be the most practically rational position to adopt. 
 
Hope and epistemic irrationality 
 Yet even if hope is practically rational, it may nonetheless be problematic. Quite 
simply, even if hope is practically rational in all of the ways that have been discussed, 
does it not still fail to be epistemically rational? Bovens thinks that wishful thinking, at 
least, is indeed epistemically irrational: ―the wishful thinker raises the subjective 
probability of desired states of the world beyond what is warranted by the available 
evidence and lowers the subjective probability of undesirable states of the world below 
what is warranted by the available evidence‖ (Bovens 1999: 678). Is hoping the same? Is 
it not tantamount to allowing oneself to believe, against the evidence, that the chances of 
a hoped-for occurrence are higher than they in fact are? 
 I think that hope need not commit us to this sort of epistemic irrationality. This is 
because, in the case of hope, it seems to me that we should see epistemic rationality as 
intimately linked to the previous discussion of practical rationality. Pettit holds that it is 
possible to separate our hopes from our beliefs (Pettit 2004: 162). Although in hoping, I 
may choose to act as if the chances of my desired prospect are higher than they are, this 
does not mean that I believe them to be. Admittedly, this sounds peculiar. We generally 
take it that rationality requires us to act on our beliefs, not on something which 
contradicts them. But I think that there is a fruitful way of understanding epistemically 
rational hope as tied to, rather than separated from, belief. I think that we must only have 
a better understanding of substantial hope as akin to positive thinking in order to see how 
it can be epistemically rational. Instead of understanding hope as separate from our 
beliefs, I think that we should treat hope as a kind of willingness to act that is influenced 
by two things: both the evidence before us, and a justified belief. This is the belief that 
hope, not through a change in external circumstances, but because of the way in which it 
bolsters our resolve, can itself alter the probability of an event coming to pass. In this 
case, it is practically rational to choose to hope – we may act in a more positive way than 
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the situation seems to warrant, because our hope actually changes that situation. The new 
evidence before us does indeed justify our hope. Epistemic rationality in the case of hope, 
then, requires us to bear centrally in mind the practical benefits of hoping. I agree with 
Pettit that people can rationally act on hope if they are ―prepared to admit to themselves 
and others that for very good, pragmatic reasons… they are refusing to expose 
themselves to the low or unstable tide of evidence‖ (Ibid.). Hope is neither epistemically 
irrational nor self-deceptive because it allows us the justified belief that hope actually 
changes the evidence when it comes to reason for action. But this can only be done if one 
is prepared to realize the pragmatic value of the link between hope and agency. In the 
context of a hope like Rawls‘s, which does not demand the same link, it seems to me that 
hoping would be epistemically irrational. Here, there is no increased sense of agency or 
bolstered sense of resolve which can change the situation in the way that is required for 
hope to be rational. Without the link between hope and agency, hope dissolves precisely 
into wishful thinking. 
 
Some final words on hope and realistic utopia 
 Of course, our assumption thus far has been that it at least may be possible for the 
tendencies and inclinations that we would need to support a well-ordered society to 
obtain. We must also admit the sad possibility that they can not. In that case, the skeptic 
might be right once again – it would be better for us not to hope after all, especially given 
the despair that comes from hoping where hope is not warranted. Yet even granting that 
this may be the case, I think for two reasons that the project of hope in political 
philosophy is one which we should undertake. 
 First, the potential gains of our project far outweigh the costs. What we stand to 
gain is far more than the pleasures of hoping. Rather, what we stand to gain is a well-
ordered society itself. Although we run the risk of despair, I think that the idea that our 
own world can be no better than it is, is itself a cause for the deepest kind of despair. That 
would be a world in which it indeed made sense to ask whether or not we should hope, 
rather than how to hope well. Even if, in the end, we fail, the potential gains of the project 
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of hoping for and working to build a well-ordered society are worth the risk. We have 
everything to gain. 
 Second, even if it is true that a well-ordered society (and the tendencies and 
inclinations that support it) cannot obtain, this does not mean that the same is true of 
something much closer to them than what we have now. We need not achieve our ideal 
itself in order to make our progress toward that ideal worthwhile. If we eliminate a few 
more forms of injustice, learn to treat each other with a little more respect and 
compassion, then our efforts will not have been in vain. And I take it as given that, even 
if we are not justified in hoping for the world of ideal theory, we are nevertheless 
justified in hoping for this much.   
 Let us return to the two possible relationships, discussed in Chapter Two, which 
can exist between realistically utopian philosophy and ideal theory. I said that 
realistically utopian philosophy could either provide the content for ideal theory, or it 
could work as a bridging device between our own world and the world that ideal theory 
describes. It seems to me then that we have a choice here, and that this choice is based 
entirely on the value that we place on hope. If we choose the first option – to allow 
realistically utopian philosophy to merely provide the content of ideal theory – then we 
do not value hope. In this case, we create no link between the world of ideal theory which 
we discuss and our own agency. We do not take the belief that it can come about and the 
desire that we have for it to obtain as motivation for any action on our parts. In short, we 
do not concern ourselves with realization. We wait, political philosophers engaged in 
wishful hoping, for something outside of ourselves to change the world around us. Here, 
we will have little choice but to reject the roles which Rawls assigns to political 
philosophy. 
 If, on the other hand, we choose the second option – to use realistically utopian 
philosophy as a bridging device between the world that we have and the world that we 
want – then we recognize the crucial value of hope to both our philosophy and our lives 
as human beings. We are only justified in having the substantial hope that Rawls wants 
realistically utopian philosophy to give us – and so only justified in being reconciled to 
our political future – if we take our desire for and our belief in the possibility of a well-
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ordered society to be motivation to act in what ways we can to bring that society about. 
And a project like this will allow us to wholeheartedly embrace the roles which Rawls 
places at the center of political philosophy. Indeed, I think that it can only be undertaken 
if we accept that these roles are crucial to our endeavor. 
 In the end, I do not think that such a form of hope is incompatible with Rawls‘s 
project as it stands. It is simply not justified by it. I quote, once again, the passage from 
The Law of Peoples which discusses realization: 
While realization is, of course, not unimportant, I believe that the very possibility 
of such a social order can itself reconcile us to the social world. The possibility is 
not mere logical possibility, but one that connects with the deep tendencies and 
inclinations of the social world. For so long as we believe for good reasons that a 
self-sustaining and reasonably just political social order both at home and abroad 
is possible, we can reasonably hope that we or others will someday, somewhere, 
achieve it; and we can then do something toward this achievement (LP 128). 
 
In the end, almost in passing, he suggests that it is at least an implication of realizability 
that we can indeed work toward realization. Rawls never says that we cannot or should 
not work for realization – he just doesn‘t require us to do so. And this is where he is 
wrong. Rawls is right that providing ourselves with hope for our political future is of the 
utmost importance, and that political philosophy could hardly have a more important role 
to play. But because he remains in ideal theory, he does not provide us with the tools that 
we need to create in ourselves a hope that is justified. We do not need to replace Rawls‘s 
account. Instead, we need to complete it. This will certainly require more of us than 
would a project that remains entirely in ideal theory. In this case, we will need to write a 
whole new sort of political philosophy: we will need to begin to write the nonideal theory 
as transition to which Rawls made his few references. And beyond that, we will need to 
engage with members of other disciplines to put into practice the recommendations that 
we make in our nonideal theory. We will need, at the most basic level, to reconceive the 
project of political philosophy. Realization must now be at its very core. 
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Conclusion: What Comes Next? 
 
 At this point one might want to point out that this thesis has been, in many ways, 
precisely what I have argued that political philosophy should not content itself with 
being: it has been a philosopher‘s project, written for other philosophers. I must admit 
that this is the case. I have not engaged in the work of realization in this project. But in 
my own defense, I take this to be a task for an entire discipline. And if the discipline is 
going to adopt this new task, then I think that there may well need to be philosophy 
written entirely for philosophers which can motivate this adoption. Perhaps this thesis 
should be thought of as an exercise in a kind of ideal theory: instead of providing content, 
it stipulates goals toward which the discipline of political philosophy should move. But 
unlike Rawls, I do not think that it is possible to end here. This project will be useless 
unless the content for moving toward those goals is provided. And I take this to be not 
only a necessary second component of my own task, but also the task of any political 
philosopher who endorses the roles that Rawls has said that political philosophy ought to 
fill. This further project is indeed a separate one – but it is not optional. So although I do 
not undertake this second task here, in order to acknowledge how important it is, I will 
end my thesis with a few suggestions on how it may be undertaken.
  
Writing nonideal theory as transition 
 First and foremost, political philosophers need to do more of the work of nonideal 
theory as transition. The work of transition from our own world to the sort of world that 
we want will be filled with unique moral political questions which, as I said in my 
introduction, political philosophers are in an exceptional position to address. Unlike the 
work of many politicians, the work of political philosophers will not be political in the 
wrong way – it will not be merely compromise between what we have and what we want. 
Instead, it will recognize the difficulties of justice and morality with which we must 
grapple, and attempt to provide novel solutions which benefit from a long history of 
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thought in moral and political philosophy. The questions which we must answer are 
many: How do we decide when to act on particular principles given by ideal theory, and 
when do we act for their sake?
25
 When can we violate a principle in the short-term in 
order to promote that same principle in the long term? How do we weigh principles 
against one another in various concrete situations? How do we promote certain values 
without violating the liberty of conscience, or falling into paternalism? Where are our 
ideals ultimately unreachable, and when they are, what should we seek to replace them 
with? And these questions, of course, are just the tip of the iceberg.  
 One of our most crucial tasks as political philosophers will be to determine where 
we should begin. The deep tendencies and inclinations of human beings, I think, will be 
good candidates for at least two reasons. First, for Rawls‘s purposes to be met, the public 
will need to be brought into the work of political philosophy. Engaging them in the 
conversation over the nature of our tendencies and inclinations, and the possibility and 
importance of changing them for the better, seems like a good starting point. This 
conversation will help to do the work of orientation by connecting these features of 
human beings with the requirements of citizenship in a political community. At the same 
time, questions about our tendencies and inclinations are an accessible place to begin a 
philosophical conversation with nonphilosophers: they are closely tied to our everyday 
moral lives, and so are already of non-abstract, immediate importance to us.  
 Second, our tendencies and inclinations are a good place for nonideal theory as 
transition to begin because broad political change will only happen if we have a 
population that wants that change. We do not now have a population whose deepest 
tendencies and inclinations are toward justice, so addressing how these features can be 
acceptably changed will be of the utmost importance.
26
 We will not be able to achieve a 
                                                 
25
 I borrow this useful distinction from Michael Phillips. He holds that ―it is important to distinguish 
between acting directly on a value and acting for the sake of a value. We might characterize this distinction 
in relation to lists of actions that instantiate the relevant value… We act directly on the value when our act 
conforms to some description on this list; we act for the sake of a value when we act with the intent to 
create a world in which that value is more widely realized‖ (Phillips 1983: 565). 
26
 Farid Abdel-Nour advocates undertaking a project with a similar emphasis, arguing that in the 
international context, at least, Rawls has failed to account for the inclinations and tendencies which people 
actually have. He says, ―When in TJ and PL Rawls undertook the similar project of clarifying the existing 
overlapping consensus in liberal societies, he could yield egalitarian principles that were anchored in 
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just society without a population that wants that sort of society to exist. But do our 
tendencies and inclinations in fact change? And how can this happen? These are of 
course separate questions. As I said in Chapter Three, our inclinations and tendencies do 
change: over time, we have become inclined to view a much broader cross-section of 
questions of inequality as being also questions of injustice. Slavery, the position of 
women, increasingly questions of the status of homosexual relationships – all of these are 
issues on which our societal position has changed dramatically over time. 
 But what of the second question? How can this happen? Kwame Anthony Appiah 
says that ―when it comes to change, what moves people is often not an argument from a 
principle, not a long discussion about values, but just a generally acquired new way of 
seeing things‖ (Appiah 2006: 73). This is at first disheartening – if arguments are not 
compelling, then what tools for social change do political philosophers really have? 
Judith Lichtenberg makes a similarly frustrating claim about a particular instance of 
changing our tendencies and inclinations: ―the most practically relevant reason people are 
not more generous toward those in need is that other people are not more generous… if 
we want people to give more, we must raise the general level of giving in a society‖ 
(Lichtenberg 2004: 88). This as well is hopelessly circular. Individuals do not give 
because we do not have a culture of giving. If we want them to give more, we must 
simply create a culture of giving. But to create a culture of giving, we must convince 
individuals to give. She recognizes that ―it is hard to get from where we are to where we 
want to go unless some individuals change their behavior, but if I am right individuals 
will not be strongly motivated to do so unless others do so as well‖ (Lichtenberg 2004: 
94). If Lichtenberg and Appiah are right about the ways in which our tendencies and 
inclinations change, then the content of the changes made in them seems to be governed 
by little more than chance.  
                                                                                                                                                 
commitments and convictions that were already in place. In LP, however, in order to yield egalitarian 
principles, Rawls had to rely on commitments that are not yet in place in the intersocietal context, but 
rather are still in need of being crystallized and brought to the fore‖ (Abdel-Nour 1999: 328). Because of 
this, philosophers committed to the law of peoples must do active work to encourage it: ―To this end, the 
advocates of such a world need to be active persuaders who do best to intrude and participate in the internal 
debates and controversies of particular societies‖ (Abdel-Nour 1999: 314). While it seems to me that he is 
wrong to  think that a similar problem does not hold in the domestic context, his emphasis on inclinations 
and tendencies and their effect on the possibility of political change seems to me to be importantly right. 
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 However, Lichtenberg also offers two suggestions for how we can extricate 
ourselves from this impotent circularity. First, we can ―rely on some free-thinking, free-
acting individuals who set an example that others are inspired or otherwise motivated to 
follow‖ (Ibid.). But this suggestion, while potentially effective, does not rescue us from 
our dependence on chance. These individuals may or may not come forward, and if and 
when they do, the rest of the population may or may not be moved to follow them. 
Second, she suggests that we can ―think about new ways to design our institutions so that 
some of the problems I have described here can be overcome‖ (Ibid.). This seems like a 
much more promising route to take, for institutions, while being part of the basic 
structure which influences people‘s lives in a largely unconscious manner, are 
nevertheless designed (at least in best-case scenarios) in thoughtful, intentional ways. 
 If we are to reconsider the institutions of a Rawlsian system, we must turn to the 
institutions of the basic structure.
27
 The basic structure is a particularly relevant place to 
begin a conversation about changing the tendencies and inclinations of citizens because 
Rawls realizes the deep influence that the basic structure has on these aspects of citizens‘ 
lives. It is precisely because citizens have grown up under a just basic structure that they 
will possess moral characters strong enough to resist temptations to injustice (JF 185). So 
if our basic structure has such a profound impact on the development of our citizens, and 
if we have control over the design of our basic structure, we ought to design our system 
very carefully in order to produce the kinds of citizens that we want. This emphasis on 
the basic structure, then, can free us from the chicken-or-egg problem of social change. A 
basic structure designed in a certain way can certainly contribute to a ―generally acquired 
new way of seeing things‖ (Appiah 2006: 73), and it can also create and express certain 
social norms which will influence the behavior of particular individuals in society, 
thereby solving problems like Lichtenberg‘s problem of giving.  
 Yet there may be serious problems with this sort of social engineering of belief 
and value. At what point does such manipulating of the basic structure constitute 
                                                 
27
 Remember that the basic structure of a society is the collection its ―main political, social, and economic 
institutions, and how they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation from one generation to 
the next‖ (PL 11). 
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paternalism? When does it begin to interfere with the liberty of conscience? At what 
point does it interfere with the ability of citizens to freely conceptualize their own forms 
of the good? I take it that these are all valid and indeed important questions, but I do not 
think that they need to damn the project of designing a basic structure with value-
education in mind.  
 We should remember that political conceptions of justice are meant to 
accommodate only reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Those comprehensive doctrines 
which advocate violations of others‘ freedoms – including the freedom of conscience – 
can not be protected by a politically liberal regime. This means already that certain 
principles (evangelicalism, inegalitarianism) will be suppressed by such a regime and 
others (toleration, respect, etc) will be encouraged. Rawls recognizes that ―the basic 
institutions those (latter) principles require inevitably encourage some ways of life and 
discourage others, or even exclude them all together‖ (PL 195). In fact, political 
liberalism not only allows, but indeed requires the encouragement of some values over 
others. Clearly, the values encouraged cannot be ones which correspond to an arbitrary 
comprehensive doctrine.
28
 Rather, the sorts of values that can be affirmed are the ones 
which make a politically liberal regime possible; these political values include civility, 
tolerance, reasonableness, and the sense of fairness (PL 194). I take it that they must also 
include a mutual recognition of the value of other individuals as citizens with the two 
moral powers, and the value of giving these other citizens justice. 
 So long as we as a community endorse political liberalism, we will also need to 
endorse and encourage these values in our citizens. The alternative to endorsing some set 
of values is to endorse no system whatsoever – but in this case we could say nothing 
whatsoever about justice, and the only political system available to us would be anarchy. 
It is an unfortunate but necessary feature of political liberalism that some comprehensive 
doctrines will place greater emphasis on the political virtues, and that these 
comprehensive doctrines will then be more strongly ―encouraged‖ by the basic structure 
of that society. This is ultimately the only way in which we can have political goals to 
work toward. If we refuse entirely to endorse political systems, then political philosophy 
                                                 
28
 Recall from Chapter One that such a society would not be stable. 
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is out of a job, and, more importantly, human societies are left rudderless.  
 
Implementing nonideal theory as transition 
 Concretely, then, how do we design a basic structure which encourages our 
political values and discourages those which contradict them? This must be the second 
task of political philosophers concerned with realization – in addition to developing novel 
proposals via nonideal theory as transition, we must join together with members of other 
disciplines to enact those proposals. Pogge recognizes that political philosophers cannot 
do this sort of practical work on their own. We will indeed begin in an area which is 
entirely philosophical, but our same project, if it is to be successful, must end in an area 
which is entirely nonphilosophical. In the middle, however, it must pass through an area 
which is genuinely interdisciplinary (Pogge 1989: 7). This is where the expert knowledge 
of philosophers must engage with the very different expert knowledge of economists, 
politicians, engineers, educators, and many others. In successful realization of justice, 
both expert theoretical and expert practical knowledge will be indispensable.  
 There are several areas, I think, where engagement with expert practical 
knowledge will prove most fruitful in our project to reshape our deep tendencies and 
inclinations. These are the fields of law and education. 
 Educational reform will serve as a kind of positive project. We can educate 
children in ways that encourage the political virtues that Rawls endorses. These virtues, 
after all, are the basis of the kinds of tendencies and inclinations that inspire us to give 
each other justice. Providing children with a broad liberal arts education will also help us 
to avoid charges of paternalism. If we teach children the skills to critically evaluate the 
political virtues, then they will not accept these virtues merely because they have learned 
them by rote. Instead, they will accept them because they are the sorts of virtues required 
to support the kind of society which could be successfully governed by the principles 
chosen in the original position. Martha Nussbaum (Poetic Justice; Cultivating Humanity) 
argues that such an education should also include an emphasis on the literary imagination 
and on a deep and broad engagement with other cultures. It is easy to translate her project 
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of breeding compassion and understanding in the face of difference into more Rawlsian 
terms: this kind of education for tolerance will help students to learn the value of freedom 
of conscience, and to acknowledge and respect the existence of other reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines in their own societies. This will be a positive project because it 
will help to instill in students an understanding of the sort of citizens that we want in our 
society.  
 Legal reform, on the other hand, can serve as a negative complement to the 
positive project of educational reform. Here, we can emphasize once again the 
importance of our citizens‘ human rights and moral powers. We can design our laws – 
and their penalties – to track these values, and to emphasize the unacceptability of their 
violation. Nussbaum is once again a prime example of a philosopher who engages in this 
sort of practical political philosophical work. In Hiding from Humanity, she argues that 
we should focus our legal system on questions of guilt rather than questions of shame, in 
order to respect and endorse the moral capabilities of our citizens. Further, she suggests 
that we change our system of penalties so that we punish most harshly the sorts of crimes 
that violate human dignity and human rights. This is why legal reform will act as a 
negative project. It will express our values to our society by showing that we will not 
stand for their violation.  
 If we can successfully use these two tools to orient the deep tendencies and 
inclinations of our fellow citizens toward justice, then we will have a population which 
possesses the motivation to work toward and support the other requirements that allow a 
well-ordered society to stably thrive.
29
 We can enact legislation that ensures a certain fair 
equality of political, social, and economic opportunity. We will begin to support taxation 
schemes, social programs, and employment restrictions that facilitate the decent 
distribution of income and wealth which allows citizens to take advantage of their basic 
freedoms. We will require that the government become, or somehow ensure that another 
party become, employer of last resort for its population so that no citizen need fear 
                                                 
29
 Recall that Rawls listed these requirements on page 50 of Justice as Fairness. While the list will likely 
not prove to be exhaustive, and while we may choose to reconceptualize or even drop some of its individual 
requirements, it nevertheless seems a promising list with which to begin our reform toward a reasonably 
just constitutional democracy.   
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joblessness. We will provide basic healthcare for all our citizens, so that no one need fear 
death or debilitation from preventable causes. And we will have a population which 
demands public financing of elections and high levels of transparency in the functioning 
of the government. As in the areas of educational and legal reform, political philosophers 
will need to work closely with experts in other disciplines to realize these projects – but 
once the tendencies and inclinations of our population have been educated toward justice, 
the groundwork for these further programs will have already been laid. 
For the tradition of political philosophy that follows in Rawls‘s footsteps, the 
terms of its own project require it to engage with the realization of its recommendations 
in our real world. If this does not depend upon the intuition with which I began, they 
nevertheless lead in the same direction. Whether we are motivated by caring deeply about 
injustice, or by caring deeply about the commitments which are required by our 
engagement with political philosophy, the result will be the same: writing about justice 
will mean working for injustice‘s abolition. 
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